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CRIMINAL LAW
I. EVIDENCE OFFERED IN MITIGATION OF A DEATH SENTENCE IS
LIMITED BY RELEVANCY
In State v. Koon,' the defendant was convicted of murder
and sentenced to death by an Aiken County jury. During the
sentencing phase of his trial, his attorneys offered in evidence
the deposition of E. Monsell Pattison, a psychiatrist and chair-
man of the Department of Psychiatry of the Medical College of
Georgia. Dr. Pattison testified that his examination of Koon re-
sulted in a diagnosis of a schizotypal personality disorder.2 The
defense also asked the doctor three questions concerning the de-
fendant's ability to adapt to long-term institutionalization, to
behave non-violently in the controlled prison environment, and
to function and contribute to society while in prison.3 The trial
court, in response to the solicitor's objection, ruled all three of
1. 278 S.C. 528, 298 S.E.2d 769 (1982).
2. Brief of Appellant at 43.
3. Q: Do you have an opinion as to [the defendant's] ability to adapt to a long-
term institutional environment?
A. Yes. Both from the records and from observing him in the jail and from
talking to him, it is, I think, quite clear in my opinion that he adapts very well
to an institutional environment ... I would be willing to risk a professional
prediction in that I would predict that he would make an overall excellent in-
stitutional adjustment on a long-term basis....
Q: Do you think Paul would be a violent person in an institutionalized
environment?
A: Again, in my professional opinion I feel confident in a reasonable frame to
conclude that he would not be violent or dangerous within a custodial institu-
tion. The basis for my opinion is his past record within the custodial environ-
ment, his ability to conform within that environment, not only to maximum
seclusion, but also conforming to the rules and regulations when he was under
minimal supervision. Furthermore, his past history and his present state sug-
gests that he performs interpersonally much better with men. That his major
provocations of explosive and assaultive behavior is with women rather than
men. Therefore, I would conclude that he would be a very good risk for good
adjustment in an institution and a very low risk for assaultive or violent behav-
ior in an institutional setting.
Q: He would be, in your opinion, could be a contributive [sic] member to a
prison institution?
A. Again, for the same reasons, I would say yes, in my professional opinion.
Record at 2277-80.
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these questions irrelevant.4
The South Carolina Supreme Court held that in capital
cases, the sentencing authority is concerned only "with the exis-
tence or non-existence of mitigating or aggravating circum-
stances involved in or arising out of the murder, not the con-
victed murderer's adaptability to prison life. The jury is
concerned with the circumstances of the crime and the charac-
teristics of the individual defendant as they bear logical rele-
vance to the crime. ' The court found support in Lockett v.
Ohio,8 where the United States Supreme Court stated that trial
judges in capital cases retain the discretion to exclude irrelevant
evidence.
A full understanding of the requirements of capital sentenc-
ing requires a review of the evolution of modern death penalty
decisions. In 1972, the United States Supreme Court, in Furman
v. Georgia,8 invalidated existing capital punishment statutes be-
cause the excessive discretion possessed by the sentencing au-
thority allowed imposition of sentences in an arbitrary manner,
"wantonly and . . . freakishly." The states were rendering
death sentences with "no meaningful basis for distinguishing the
few cases in which it is imposed from the many cases in which it
is not." 10 Without sentencing guidelines embodied in statutes,
such schemes were "pregnant with discrimination," '11 with the
ever present danger that racial bias would influence sentencing.
Following Furman, the states rushed to draft statutes which
were supposedly consistent with the innumerable constructions
which could be given that decision. The most common answer to
Furman was a list of statutory aggravating and mitigating cir-
cumstances, causing the sentencers to focus on the circum-
stances of each crime and of each defendant while limiting the
availability of the death penalty to cases involving at least one
aggravating circumstance.12 In 1976, the Court upheld three
4. Record at 1654-55.
5. 278 S.C. at 536, 298 S.E.2d at 774.
6. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
7. 438 U.S. at 604 n.12.
8. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
9. Id. at 310 (Stevens, J., concurring).
10. Id. at 313 (White, J., concurring).
11. Id. at 257 (Douglas, J., concurring).
12. North Carolina interpreted Furman as requiring that no discretion be vested in
[Vol. 36
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state death penalty statutes as consistent with Furman.13 The
Court interpreted these statutes as creating no substantial risk
that the death penalty would be inflicted in an arbitrary or ca-
pricious manner.14 In striking down the mandatory death pen-
alty statute passed in North Carolina, however, a plurality noted
that a necessary component of the sentencing scheme is consid-
eration of the character and record of the individual offender
and the circumstances of the particular crime.
15
Finally, in Lockett v. Ohio,' Chief Justice Burger, writing
for a plurality, held that a defendant has the right to require
that the sentencing authority be given the opportunity to con-
sider mitigating circumstances in the individual case. The Court
invalidated an Ohio statute which limited the sentencer's discre-
tion to only three mitigating circumstances, stating:
[W]e conclude that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments
require that the sentencer, in all but the rarest kind of capital
case, not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor,
any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the
circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a
basis for a sentence less than death.
1 8
The Court based its holding on the American tradition of indi-
vidualized sentencing,' pulling further away from the Furman
requirement that sentencing discretion be limited.
Under the Lockett requirement, states may limit the types
of circumstances to be considered and comply with the letter
the sentencers and enacted a mandatory death penalty for aggravated murder. This stat-
ute was overturned in Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (see infra note 15
and accompanying text).
13. The Court upheld the capital sentencing statutes of Florida, Georgia, and Texas,
respectively, in Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976), Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153
(1976), and Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976). The Court invalidated the statutes of
North Carolina, supra note 12 and infra note 15, and of Louisiana, Roberts v. Louisiana,
428 U.S. 325 (1976).
14. Typical of the Court's interpretation is the language of Justice Stewart's opinion
in Gregg, 428 U.S. at 188.
15. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976).
16. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
17. Those circumstances were: (1) where the victim induced or facilitated the de-
fense; (2) where duress, coercion or strong provocation existed; and (3) where the offense
was the product of psychosis or mental deficiency, though such condition was insufficient
to establish the defense of insanity. 438 U.S. at 612-13.
18. Id. at 604 (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted).
19. Id. at 602.
1984]
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but perhaps not the spirit of the opinion. Lockett could even be
read as imposing no positive duty to consider all mitigating evi-
dence offered, regardless of its connection to the defendant or
his crime. Instead, the Court requires only that before imposing
sentence, the sentencing authority consider the defendant's
character and record along with the circumstances of the crime.
This point was made clear when the Lockett opinion stated:
"Nothing in this opinion limits the traditional authority of a
court to exclude, as irrelevant, evidence not bearing on the de-
fendant's character, prior record, or the circumstances of his
offense."20
This exclusion of evidence as irrelevant has arisen in many
post-Lockett decisions. 21 Even in capital cases, the trial judge
must have discretion to limit the introduction of evidence by use
of some standard. These standards are generally found in rules
of evidence. In capital sentencing, however, the full exploration
of the mitigating and aggravating circumstances requires that
the rules be bent to some extent. In Lockett, the Chief Justice
wrote that "where sentencing discretion is granted, it generally
has been agreed that the sentencing judge's 'possession of the
fullest information possible concerning the defendant's life and
characteristics' is '[hjighly relevant-if not essential-[to the]
selection of an appropriate sentence.' ,,22 Whether ordinary evi-
dence rules which would restrict the sentencer's access to this
information may stand after the Lockett decision was answered
in Green v. Georgia,23 where the Supreme Court held that the
rationale of Chambers v. Mississippi24 precludes a state court
from excluding evidence "highly relevant to a critical issue in
the punishment phase ' 25 when there is substantial assurance of
its reliability. Still, the question of what is relevant to sentenc-
ing remains unanswered.
Koon argued that under Lockett as well as the State's own
20. Id. at 604 n.12.
21. See infra notes 30-32.
22. 438 U.S. at 602-03 (quoting Williams v. New York, 358 U.S. 576, 585 (1959))
(emphasis by the Chief Justice in Lockett).
23. 442 U.S. 95 (1979).
24. 410 U.S. 284 (1973). Chambers held that states could not mechanistically apply
rules of evidence to defeat the ends of justice when a state's voucher rule prevented the
defendant from cross-examining an adverse witness.
25. 442 U.S. at 97.
[Vol. 36
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death penalty statute,2" the sentencing authority must consider
all circumstances which would tend to reduce a defendant's sen-
tence.27 This proof would necessarily include predictions by a
qualified expert that the defendant would likely adjust to life
imprisonment and would not be a threat to the prison popula-
tion or to society outside the prison walls. Koon contended that
under Jurek v. Texas 28 "any sentencing authority must predict a
convicted person's probable future conduct when it engages in
the process of determining what punishment to impose.1
2 9
In practice, the courts have not followed the Jurek dicta.
They consistently hold that evidence not relevant to the matter
at issue-the defendant's character, record, or the circumstances
of the charged offense-may be excluded from the sentencing
phase of a capital trial at the court's discretion.30 Thus, courts
hold that retribution and deterrent evidence is irrelevant; a
judge may exclude evidence of the procedures for carrying out a
death sentence 1 as well as evidence tending to show the failure
26. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 16-3-20(c) (Supp. 1983).
27. Brief of Appellant at 44-45.
28. 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
29. Id. at 275. In Barefoot v. Estelle, 103 S. Ct. 3383 (1983), the Court held that
psychiatric testimony for the prosecution which sought to predict future violent behavior
was not improper at a sentencing trial. The Court rejected the defendant's argument
that such testimony was unworthy of belief, stating "We are unconvinced. . . that the
adversary process cannot be trusted to sort out the reliable from the unreliable evidence
and opinion about future dangerousness, particularly when the convicted felon has the
opportunity to present his own side of the case." Id. at 3398.
30. Harris v. Pulley, 692 F.2d 1189 (9th Cir. 1982), rev'd on different grounds, 104 S.
Ct. 872 (1984); Horton v. State, 249 Ga. 871, 295 S.E.2d 281 (1982); People v. Free, 94 h1.
2d 378, 447 N.E.2d 218 (1983); State v. Cherry, 298 N.C. 86, 257 S.E.2d 551 (1979), cert.
denied, 446 U.S. 941 (1980); Rodriquez v. State, 641 S.W.2d 669 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983).
Of these cases, Horton and Rodriquez are most significant to the facts here. In Horton,
the court cited footnote 12 in Lockett in excluding the defendant's argument at sentenc-
ing that he would not be eligible for parole for at least 20 years. 295 S.E.2d at 284. In
Rodriquez the defendant's psychologist attempted to testify to the number of "soci-
opaths" in the prison system. The court held this evidence properly excluded. 641
S.W.2d at 673-74.
31. Cases holding that a trial judge may exclude evidence of the procedures for car-
rying out the death sentence are Harris v. Pulley, 692 F.2d 1189, 1203 (9th Cir. 1982);
Simmons v. State, 278 Ark. 305, 318, 645 S.W.2d 680, 687 (1983); Songer v. State, 365 So.
2d 696 (Fla. 1978); Horton v. State, 249 Ga. 871, 873, 295 S.E.2d 281, 284-85 (1982);
State v. Thompson, 278 S.C. 1, 11, 292 S.E.2d 581, 587 (1982). Of these, Simmons is most
informative. It held that such proof was simply not mitigating evidence. 278 Ark. at 318,
645 S.W.2d at 687. Only evidence of the defendant's record and character of offense is
relevant. See supra note 30.
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of capital punishment as a deterrent to serious crime.32
The South Carolina Supreme Court explained its Koon de-
cision in State v. Plath.33 In Plath, the defense presented expert
testimony which attempted to demonstrate the deprivation
caused by a life sentence, and likened such punishment to a
form of slavery. The defense also presented evidence indicating
the ineffectiveness of capital punishment as a deterrent to crime,
concluding that as a matter of social policy, life imprisonment
for persons such as the defendant was preferred. In distinguish-
ing between similar testimony held irrelevant in Koon and char-
acter evidence, the court stated:
The distinction lies in the lack of logical connection between
adaptability to confinement and the specific personality or
character traits which were instrumental in leading the defen-
dant to commit the particular crime at issue. The dividing line
is fine indeed, yet not impossible of discernment. A jury needs
to know how a given defendant came to commit a given aggra-
vated murder, to include aspects of his background, his charac-
ter and the setting of the crime itself which may explain or
even mitigate the conduct of which he has been found guilty. A
jury does not need to know how often he will take a shower or
whether or not he will be lonely and withdrawn during his ten-
ure [in prison] .
34
The court in Plath also cautioned the bench not to tolerate
excursions by the defense into social policy and penology.35 The
jury should not be permitted to intrude upon the legislature's
role in determining the social utility of capital punishment. "In
32. Holding that the judge may exclude offers of proof that capital punishment is
not a deterrent to crime are State v. Cherry, 298 N.C. 86, 97-99, 257 S.E.2d 551, 559-60
(1979); State v. Johnson, 632 S.W.2d 542 (Tenn. 1982). In Cherry, the court held that
evidence in a sentencing trial was properly excluded when it consisted of the affidavit of
a convicted felony murderer that he had been rehabilitated and was serving a responsible
role in society, a psychiatrist's affidavit that the death penalty fails as a deterrent, and
the affidavit of a minister stating his religious objections to capital punishment. 298 N.C.
at 97-99, 257 S.E.2d at 559. In Johnson the defense offered "expert" opinion on the
validity of the death penalty as a deterrent, the morality of western society, and the
relationship between youth and accountability for decisionmaking. It was held that such
evidence is irrelevant and inadmissible, even under a statute, TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2-
203(c) (1982), which calls for consideration of any relevant evidence in sentencing trials.
632 S.W.2d at 547-48.
33. 281 S.C. 1, 313 S.E.2d 619 (1984).
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the sentencing phase of a capital case, the jury shall understand
the terms 'life imprisonment' and 'death sentence' in their ordi-
nary and plain meaning without elaboration."3 Thus, sentencing
authorities in South Carolina may not consider the general va-
lidity of the death sentence as a retributive or determining tool,
but must maintain a "strict focus" on the relevant issues.
The court, however, failed to consider that evidence of a
prisoner's adaptability to the institutional environment may be
a positive aspect of his character to be considered in mitigation
of a sentence. Predictions that a prisoner will desist from violent
behavior while incarcerated may indicate a potential for rehabil-
itation. The jury should be able to assign whatever weight they
deem appropriate to this aspect of his character. Instead of con-
struing such evidence simply to demonstrate that Koon would
likely "behave himself" while confined in the intolerably bleak
conditions of prison, the court could interpret this offer as relat-
ing to his character. As such, it is universally held relevant to
sentencing.3 7
Ronald Tate, Jr.
36. Id. at 14, 313 S.E.2d at 627.
37. The court alternatively held that the psychiatrist's testimony could be excluded
as cumulative to the testimony of another defense psychiatrist. However, the appellant
contended that Dr. Pattison's testimony in the deposition, see supra note 3, explored
issues not covered by the other expert, who had failed to offer an opinion on Koon's
future behavior as an inmate or on the likelihood that he would not be violent in a prison
environment. Brief of Appellant at 45-46. To the contrary, the other psychiatrist left the
jury with the impression that Koon might have violent episodes in the future. Brief of
Appellant at 46.
On resentencing, Koon was again sentenced to death. At the resentencing trial,
Koon offered the testimony of two prison guards who would testify that Koon had been a
model prisoner during the two and one-half years of incarceration since the crime and
had adjusted well to the prison environment. Consistent with Koon I, the defense cau-
tioned the guards not to speculate about Koon's future adaptability or behavior. Never-
theless, the trial judge interpreted Koon I as permitting the exclusion of this testimony
because it bore no "logical relationship to the crime itself." Transcript at 9-17.
The supreme court held that past behavior in prison does bear on a defendant's
character and is relevant. However, this exclusion was not reversible error since the court
found that similar evidence was admitted and that the testimony would have been cu-
mulative. Thus, Koon's death sentence stands. State v. Koon, No. 22075, slip op. (S.C.
April 3, 1984).
7
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II. IMPROPER ARGUMENTS BY THE SOLICITOR
State v. Smart38 is the latest among a line of decisions re-
quiring prosecutorial adherence to professional standards while
addressing the jury during the sentencing phase of a capital
trial. The South Carolina Supreme Court held four specific ref-
erences by the solicitor during the sentencing phase improper
and ordered resentencing. In contrast, the court also concluded
that the solicitor's guilt phase argument that the state's evidence
had been uncontradicted was not an improper comment on the
defendant's failure to testify.39
Ronald Francis Smart was charged with four counts of mur-
der, and the solicitor sought the death penalty. During the guilt
phase of the trial, the defense introduced into evidence Smart's
recorded statements which had been taped by Cayce police
while he was in custody. These tapes revealed Smart's motiva-
tion for the two admitted killings, and also gave an indication of
Smart's state of mind at the time of arrest.40 The defendant,
38. 278 S.C. 515, 299 S.E.2d 686 (1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1784 (1983).
39. The court also criticized the recent misuse of the voir dire examination in capi-
tal cases. The court commented on the "extraordinary degree of freedom" given the de-
fense in conducting the voir dire and noted that there is no right to use the examination
to develop personality profiles of the veniremen. The court pointed to one exchange dur-
ing the voir dire in Smart where a defense attorney questioned a female juror on her
drinking habits. 278 S.C. at 523, 299 S.E.2d at 690. The special voir dire provisions of
S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(D) (Supp. 1983) are not a "license to forage at will over the
private lives of jurors." Id. The court criticized this practice as a waste of time and an
intrusion into the juror's privacy which diminishes the public's respect for jury duty. Id.
The court suggested that the trial court conduct a preliminary voir dire examination in
advance of counsel to narrow the questioning to relevant matters. Id. See also State v.
Plath, 281 S.C. 1, 313 S.E.2d 619 (1984).
40. In the first tape, recorded soon after his arrest, Smart raves about "Red Dog,"
who killed all of the victims, and about "demons" inside him. The second, recorded 45
minutes later, presents a more coherent explanation. Smart contended that he killed two
of the men in a fight after Smart objected to one of the men sleeping with a thirteen year
old girl. He explained that the two male victims killed the two women and that Smart
killed the two men. This explanation appears to have carried weight with the jury as
Smart was acquitted of murdering the two females.
When the defense proffered the tapes, the jury was excused and the trial judge told
defense counsel:
8
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however, did not testify at trial. In his closing argument, the so-
licitor commented that certain of the state's evidence was un-
contradicted, and asked the jury whether anyone had testified
that robbery was not Smart's motive for the killings.41 Smart
was found guilty of two murders and acquitted of the others.
During the sentencing phase, the solicitor focused on his
own decision to seek the death penalty.42 Referring to Smart's
prior escape,48 the solicitor stated that law officers who had
risked their lives in recapturing Smart would be aggrieved by
I think you gentlemen should know and the defendant should know, and I
address myself to the defendant personally, that if these tapes are played after
being presented in evidence for the defense, any right against self-incrimina-
tion is waived. These tapes being offered by the defense don't come within the
pervue [sic] of Miranda.
Record at 1745.
Defense counsel, after conferring with Smart, responded: "As we understand it we
are waiving any rights as to the admissibility of the tapes. We are not waiving any right
we have with regard to the defendant remaining silent."
The court replied: "Except to the extent he is not silent on the tapes. Obviously
you can't waive that." Record at 1746 (emphasis added).
41. The solicitor stated:
They [the defense] are going to say murder couldn't have been committed dur-
ing the course of stealing or robbing with a deadly weapon because they were
all dead, and he didn't intend to rob them. That's what they are going to tell
you. Is that in the record? Has anybody testified to that, that robbery wasn't
his motive, or he didn't intend to steal anything? I didn't hear it. If you did,
then you give it whatever weight you deem necessary.
Record at 2291-92.
The defense argued on appeal that since the only other witnesses to the killings were
the victims themselves, and since a defendant's motive or intent is inherently something
about which only the defendant himself can provide direct evidence, these comments
could have no effect other than to focus the jury's attention on the defendant's failure to
testify. Brief of Appellant at 63.
42. The solicitor argued during the sentencing phase: "I know what you are going
through because I went through it. You see, under the law I must notify the defendant if
the death penalty is going to be an issue in the case or not." Record at 2287. He further
stated:
I had to go through what you folks are going through a long time ago. I had to
look at the facts in the case. I had to look at the law. I had to talk with the
police officers. I had to talk with the victim's families and friends. I had to take
into consideration what Lexington County wanted.
Record at 2287.
43. Smart's escape and hostage-taking episode, which occurred during the trial, was
not revealed to the jury. As a security measure, the defendant was not brought into the
courtroom during a supplemental instruction to answer the jury's questions. The court,
refusing to presume prejudice to the defendant in such circumstances, distinguished con-
flicting cases on the facts.
9
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any sentence less than death." After urging that the people of
Lexington County would disapprove of a life sentence,4 the so-
licitor concluded that the death penalty statute would be ripe
for repeal if it was not imposed in this case.46 The jury recom-
mended the death sentence.
A. Solicitor's Comments on the Evidence
A prosecutor may not comment on the accused's post-arrest
silence or his failure to testify at trial.47 Thus, it has been held
that a prosecutor refers to silence when it is either his "manifest
intention" to draw attention to the silence or when the jury
could infer naturally and necessarily that it was a comment on
the defendant's silence.48 The State may, however, comment on
the failure of the defense to rebut the government's case,4 and
statements that certain testimony or evidence is uncontradicted
have been held proper. 0 Obviously, it is often difficult to deter-
mine when a prosecutor is properly commenting on the totality
of the evidence and when he begins to improperly comment on
the defendant's failure to testify.
Smart contended that the remarks referring to his lack of
zeal in revealing the truth were designed to call attention to his
failure to testify. The supreme court rejected this argument and
chose a different analysis. The court neglected the "manifest in-
tention" test and held that by using his tape recorded state-
44. "What do we say to those law enforcement officers out on the hunt Wednesday
night? What do we say to them in the line of duty putting their lives on the line every
day? Well, if they kill you, we are sorry fellows, but keep on doing your job?" Record at
2311.
45. See supra note 5.
46. "If this is not the case for the death penalty, I say let's take the law book on the
front lawn of the courthouse and rip the death pages out and throw them away, because
it should never apply in Lexington County if it doesn't [apply] here." Record at 2311.
47. Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308 (1976); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18
(1967); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
48. United States v. Whitehead, 618 F.2d 523 (4th Cir. 1980); United States v. Ed-
wards, 576 F.2d 1152 (5th Cir. 1978); State v. Rouse, 262 S.C. 581, 206 S.E.2d 873 (1974).
In Rouse the solicitor's comment that "[i]t is undisputed what happened in the store
that day" was held not improper, although the court admitted that an improper com-
ment on the defendant's silence may sometimes be indirect.
49. United States v. Fogg, 652 F.2d 551 (5th Cir. 1981).
50. State v. Robinson, 238 S.C. 140, 119 S.E.2d 671 (1961); State v. Wilkins, 217 S.C.
105, 59 S.E.2d 853 (1950).
[Vol. 36
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ments, the defendant put his own words in evidence. This
opened the door for the solicitor's comment on the evidence as if
it had been live testimony.
Because the court failed to cite any authority for this hold-
ing, it is necessary to search for the principles on which such a
decision may rest. The court could have supported its decision
by reference to either of two principles. First, it is proper for a
prosecutor to comment on a defendant's failure to fully testify
when he takes the stand but refuses to submit to cross-examina-
tion.5 1 By equating Smart's lengthy taped explanations to live
testimony, the court could base its holding on this principle, and
it appears to have done so in stating:
By the device of his tape recorded statements, the appellant
through his own words put before the jury several alternative
versions of the killings .... With the appellant's own words in
evidence, it was by no means improper for the solicitor to ques-
tion their veracity and direct the jury's attention to actual evi-
dence already admitted which appellant in his statement
seemed to disregard or implicitly refute.
52
Second, the court might have relied on the "invited error
doctrine." This theory holds that a party who by some act or
comment induces his opponent to commit error may not com-
51. Johnson v. United States, 318 U.S. 189 (1943); Caminetti v. United States, 242
U.S. 470 (1917); United States v. Hearst, 563 F.2d 1331, 1342 (9th Cir. 1977); United
States v. Weber, 437 F.2d 327 (3d Cir. 1970); State v. Woomer, 277 S.C. 170, 284 S.E.2d
357 (1981).
In Hearst, Patricia Hearst took the stand to testify to events from the time of her
kidnapping in February 1974 through September of that year. Her testimony then
jumped a full year to the time of her arrest in September 1975. On Cross-examination,
she refused to answer questions regarding that year, invoking the Fifth Amendment
forty-two times. The Ninth Circuit upheld the finding that Hearst had waived her privi-
lege against self-incrimination as to all relevant matters by taking the stand. Thus, the
prosecutor was allowed to continue asking questions knowing that she would refuse to
answer. This was interpreted as a comment on her failure to testify to those matters,
which was held proper under Caminetti.
In Woomer, the defendant was allowed to testify, during the guilt phase of his mur-
der trial, to the voluntariness of his confession. The South Carolina Supreme Court
stated that it knew of no rule which would allow a defendant to take the stand for a
limited purpose. The general rule is that once the defendant takes the stand in his own
behalf, he waives any privilege against compulsory self-incrimination and must answer
all questions. 278 S.C. at 172, 284 S.E.2d at 358.
52. 278 S.C. at 526, 299 S.E.2d at 692.
19841
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plain of that error on appeal. In Babb v. United States,8 de-
fense counsel told the jury that the defendant did not take the
stand because of the attorney's trial tactics, not because he
wished to conceal the truth. The Eighth Circuit held that such a
comment opened the door for the prosecutor to comment on the
defendant's failure to testify." In Smart, the defendant's act of
putting his own words into evidence while not actually taking
the witness stand might have invited the prosecutor's adverse
comment. However, the invited error doctrine has never been
extended to a capital case. For obvious reasons, its use in such a
circumstance must be restricted.
Smart should be narrowly interpreted by the bench. Serious
self-incrimination problems would be raised by broadening the
scope of prosecutorial comment in contexts beyond the unique
facts of this case. The judge expressly warned the defendant
that the introduction of the taped statements would constitute
waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination to the extent of
its contents, yet the tapes were played, and the defendant's
words and explanations were placed into evidence. This had the
effect of live testimony, with the defendant maintaining the dis-
tinct advantage of not being subject to cross-examination.
53. 351 F.2d 863 (8th Cir. 1965).
54. In United States ex rel Miller v. Follette, 397 F.2d 363 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. de-
nied, 393 U.S. 1039 (1969), the court held that a pro se defendant who twice called at-
tention to his failure to testify in order to explain his reasons for not doing so invited
prosecutorial comment.
In United States v. Feinberg, 140 F.2d 592 (2d Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 726
(1944), Judge Learned Hand wrote:
The next complaint is that in his closing address the prosecutor commented
upon the fact that none of the accused took the stand. At first blush this ap-
pears as a grave error, but on closer examination it turns out to have been
quite justified .... [C]ounsel had said that the jury had heard all the testi-
mony "and the defendants, if they took the stand, could not add anything to
that.... ." In so assuring the jury, the counsel invited their consideration of
what the accused would have said on the stand, and surely he surrendered any
privilege they had not to testify.
140 F.2d at 595.
Closer to the point is Manuel v. State, 541 P.2d 233 (Okla. Crim. App. 1975). The
state was allowed to introduce the defendant's prior statements. The defense counsel
stated that the accused actually did testify through those statements, and equated the
statements with live testimony. The prosecutor was allowed to argue that the defendant
was not a witness and never took the stand. This was held proper under the invited error
doctrine.
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B. Solicitor's Comments During the Sentencing Phase
Regarding the solicitor's remarks during the sentencing
phase of the trial, the court amplified its earlier opiions limit-
ing the scope of prosecutorial comment.55 Remarks improperly
drawing attention to the solicitor's decision to seek the death
penalty and comments on the feelings of other citizens and po-
lice officers regarding the sentence in this case were prejudicial
and warranted a new sentencing trial. The court admonished
both bench and bar to recognize that "[c]apital sentencing is a
process specific to the crime and the defendant. . . ,56 By in-
troducing considerations extraneous to the case, such as popular
opinion, the solicitor improperly went beyond the "strict focus
upon the particular circumstances of the specific crime and the
unique attributes of the defendant.
'57
In State v. Linder,58 the court recognized that it is the duty
of the solicitor to zealously prosecute the case, but his higher
duty is to see that justice is done. Closing arguments should be
tailored so as not to appeal to the personal biases of the jurors
and they should not be calculated to arouse passion or
prejudice.5 9 The prohibition against such passionate argument
55. See infra notes 59 & 65 and accompanying text.
56. 278 S.C. at 526-27, 299 S.E.2d at 693.
57. Id.
58. 276 S.C. 304, 278 S.E.2d 335 (1981).
59. Id. at 312, 278 S.E.2d at 339. In State v. Sloan, 278 S.C. 435, 298 S.E.2d 92
(1982), the solicitor made three improperly passionate arguments to the jury. He urged
that if the defendant was found innocent, the crime would remain unsolved. 278 S.C. at
438, 298 S.E.2d at 93. The solicitor also commented on the defendant's refusal to discuss
the case with the state's psychiatrist, 278 S.C. at 440, 298 S.E.2d at 94, and argued that
the defendant's pleas of not guilty should be considered as evidence of lack of remorse.
"Has anyone said to you he's sorry, sorry for what he did?... What have you been told
up until you found him guilty? He has pled not guilty ... Is that someone who wants
to be rehabilitated?" 278 S.C. at 440, 298 S.E.2d at 95. This was held improper.
In State v. Butler, 277 S.C. 543, 290 S.E.2d 420 (1982), the solicitor stated: "[R]est
assured ... that you would not be sitting in judgment upon this case unless I hadn't
decided that his case deserves to be where it is .... This is one of the strongest cases
overall that I have prosecuted in my eight and one-half years." 277 S.C. at 546-47, 290
S.E.2d at 422. The court held this prejudicial.
In State v. Adams, 277 S.C. 115, 283 S.E.2d 582 (1981), the solicitor, in cross-exam-
ining the defendant, asked the defendant whether he had read his alleged confession,
and whether "[t]he content of this statement ... is one of the most cruel and brutal
things that has ever happened, whoever did it? ... [W]hoever did it should die,
shouldn't they? Adams responded that the person who did such things should die. The
supreme court held this questioning improper delving into punishment during the guilt
1984]
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arises from the idea that when the opinion of a judge or solicitor
becomes a factor in the jury's deliberation as though it were it-
self evidence justifying capital punishment, the death sentence
may be tainted by an arbitrary factor and would be improper
under the South Carolina Code. 0
State v. Durden1 set the parameters for prosecutorial argu-
ment. So long as the prosecutor stays within the record and its
reasonable inferences, he may:
employ any legitimate means of impressing on [the jury] their
true responsibility in this respect as by stating that a failure to
enforce the law begets lawlessness. Thus, he may in effect tell
them that the people look to them for protection against crime
... to dwell on the evil results of crime and to urge a fearless
administration of the criminal law .... 62
Mr. Justice Bussey, in his concurrence, stated that this passage
gave too much discretion to the solicitor. He would have instead
adopted the American Bar Association Standard relating to
prosecutorial argument: "The prosecutor should refrain from ar-
gument which would divert the jury from its duty to decide the
case on the evidence, by injecting issues broader than the guilt
or innocence of the accused under the controlling law, or by
making predictions of the consequences of the jury's verdict.""3
Implicit in the Smart decision is the solicitor's invasion of
the province of the jury in drawing attention to his own decision
to seek the death penalty. This not only injects his personal
phase. 277 S.C. at 119-20, 283 S.E.2d at 584.
In State v. Plath, 277 S.C. 126, 284 S.E.2d 221 (1981), the solicitor stated to the jury
that if the jury failed to recommend the death penalty in this case, he would never seek
it again. 277 S.C. at 143, 284 S.E.2d at 230. The solicitor in Smart made an identical
argument, and it too was held improper. 278 S.C. at 526, 299 S.E.2d at 692.
60. State v. Woomer, 277 S.C. 170, 175, 284 S.E.2d 357, 359 (1981); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 16-3.20(C) (Supp. 1983).
61. 264 S.C. 86, 212 S.E.2d 587 (1975).
62. Id. at 92, 212 S.E.2d at 590 (quoting from 23A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1107
(1961)).
63. 264 S.C. at 93-94, 212 S.E.2d at 591 (Bussey, J., concurring); ABA STANDAns
FOR CRIMINAL JUSTIcE RELATING To ARGUMENTS OF rnH PRosEcuToR To THE JURY § 5.8
(Approved Draft 1971).
Such comments also raise ethical questions. In State v. Sloan, 278 S.C. 435, 438, 298
S.E.2d 92, 93 (1982), the court cited DR 7-106(C)(4): "[A]n attorney has an ethical re-
sponsibility to refrain from expressing to the jury his personal beliefs about. the merits of
a case." S.C. Sup. CT. R. 32, DR 7-108(C)(4) (Supp. 1983).
[Vol. 36
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opinion into the deliberation, but also minimizes the jury's re-
sponsibility for the defendant's fate. State v. Woomer," decided
after the trial in Smart, made it clear that a reversal is necessary
when a prosecutor attempts to diminish the great responsibility
placed solely on the jury for imposing the death sentence, by
stressing that he made this decision for them when he decided
to seek the death penalty.6
While Smart stands as a warning to solicitors to avoid im-
passioned arguments in sentencing trials, its most significant as-
pect is the allowance of solicitor's comments, however oblique,
on the defendant's failure to testify. It bears repeating that this
case is special on its facts, as it is rare that a defendant is al-
lowed to introduce his own taped statement and avoid full testi-
mony. To allow adverse comment whenever the defendant places
his words into evidence, by prior written statements or other-
wise, could interfere with his right to present a defense as well
as his privilege against self-incrimination.
Ronald Tate, Jr.
III. INTERFERENCE BY THE TRIAL JUDGE IN JuRY DELIBERATIONS
State v. Elmores6 made it clear that the South Carolina Su-
preme Court will not tolerate any interference by the trial judge
in jury deliberations such as entering the jury room to answer
questions, requesting periodic status reports on deliberations, or
issuing supplementary charges which could be interpreted as bi-
ased or coercive. Edward Lee Elmore was charged with murder,
first-degree criminal sexual conduct, and burglary. The solicitor
sought the death penalty. During the guilt phase of the trial, the
judge entered the jury room to answer a question. He was ac-
64. 277 S.C. 170, 284 S.E.2d 357 (1981).
65. Typically, these comments which diminish the jury's responsibility for the sen-
tence fail because they refer to the solicitor's initial decision to seek the death penalty.
State v. Butler, 277 S.C. 543, 290 S.E.2d 420 (1982); State v. Koon, 278 S.C. 528, 298
S.E.2d 769 (1982); State v. Woomer, 277 S.C. 170, 284 S.E.2d 357 (1981). The solicitor
may have commented that the judge bears the ultimate burden of sentencing, as in State
v. Plath, 277 S.C. 126, 284 S.E.2d 221 (1981). Other solicitors have impermissibly re-
ferred to mandatory appellate review or other institutional protections, as in State v.
Sloan, 278 S.C. 435, 298 S.E.2d 92 (1982); State v. Linder, 276 S.C. 304, 278 S.E.2d 335
(1981); State v. Gilbert, 273 S.C. 690, 258 S.E.2d 890 (1979); and State v. Tyner, 273 S.C.
646, 258 S.E.2d 559 (1979).
66. 279 S.C. 417, 308 S.E.2d 781 (1983).
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companied by counsel from both sides but not by the defendant.
Elmore was later found guilty. While the jury was deliberating
on the penalty, the judge again entered the jury room, without
counsel, and requested that periodic status reports on the jury's
progress be sent to him.
These status reports revealed that the jury was deadlocked,
with one member voting contrary to the others. The judge then
charged, referring to the voir dire examination, that:
[I]n every case, we discussed that with you. We knew what
members of the jury panel were opposed to the concept of
capital punishment.... [1]n every case of my examination of
each one of you, you each, without equivocation, without hesi-
tation, told me under oath that you could render a verdict sup-
ported by the evidence and the law in the case; a recommenda-
tion of either one of the recommended punishments .... Now,
of course, I do not wish to identify any persons of the jury...
but I felt it was imperative that I go back over this point of the
jury selection process with you.
67
The jury later returned a recommendation of death, and Elmore
appealed both the conviction and the sentencing procedure.
The supreme court reversed the convictions and criticized
the sentencing procedure. The judge's presence in the jury room
on both occasions constituted elementary error. Entering the
jury room to answer a question was a violation of judicial propri-
ety despite the fact that the judge was accompanied by counsel
from both sides.08 The defendant was excluded from the con-
frontation with the jury, so his right to be present at all stages of
the trial was violated.6 9 This right to be present has been held to
extend to supplemental questions of the jury.70 The court firmly
cautioned against such behavior in the future and held that the
absence of prejudice to the defendant had no bearing on the ex-
istence of reversible error created by such conduct.
7 1
67. Id. at 423-24, 308 S.E.2d at 785-86 (emphasis by the court).
68. Id. at 421-22, 308 S.E.2d at 784-85.
69. Id. at 422, 308 S.E.2d at 785 (citing State v. Taylor, 261 S.C. 437, 442, 200
S.E.2d 387, 389 (1973)).
70. Rogers v. U.S., 422 U.S. 35, 39 (1975); see also State v. Smart, 278 S.C. 515, 299
S.E.2d 686 (1982).
71. But cf. Rogers v. United States, 422 U.S. 35, 40 (1975) (a violation of defen-
dant's right to be present at every stage of trial may in some situations be harmless
error); State v. Smart, 278 S.C. 515, 524-25, 299 S.E.2d 686, 691-92 (mere absence of
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The most important issue here is judicial coercion of the
jury to reach a verdict. In condemning the entrance into the jury
room and the requests for status reports, the court cited State v.
Middleton,72 which dealt with inquiries by the court into the
jury's failure to agree.
When a jury is unable to agree, the court may properly re-
call them for the purpose of ascertaining whether such disagree-
ment arises from the facts or from the law. If the former, the
judge may inquire whether there is a reasonable prospect of
agreement on the facts or whether the disagreement is irrecon-
cilable. If the latter, it is proper for the trial judge to give fur-
ther instructions. It is improper, however, to make the jury
members reveal their standing in regard to a conviction or ac-
quittal of the accused. 8 Middleton also allows the judge to give
supplemental instructions to a divided jury, but only within the
limits of Allen v. United States.74
The court in Elmore reaffirmed the view in Middleton that
supplemental instructions to a divided jury must be limited to
the factually neutral charge upheld in Allen. 5 The court found
the entire instruction in Elmore highly prejudicial and coercive.
Without doubt, the charge was directed to the juror or jurors
who were voting against the death sentence by calling attention
to the process of voir dire examination in which the jurors were
chosen on the basis of their ability to render a death sentence. 8
In effect, the trial court questioned why those jurors, who had
stated earlier that under the right facts they would be able to
vote for the death penalty, could not do so now. The supreme
court also stated that the instruction urged agreement at all
costs rather than reminding the jury of its right to retain consci-
defendant does not create a presumption of prejudice justifying reversal of conviction).
72. 218 S.C. 452, 63 S.E.2d 163 (1951).
73. Id. at 457, 63 S.E.2d at 165.
74. 164 U.S. 492 (1896).
75. 279 S.C. at 424, 308 S.E.2d at 786.
76. Id. See Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968), which noted that a chal-
lenge for cause may be used against a venireman who states an absolute refusal to return
a death sentence, while a juror may not be challenged for cause simply because he is
opposed to the concept of capital punishment. Compare the South Carolina Code, which
states that "a person may not be disqualified, excused or excluded from service as a juror
therein by reason of his beliefs or attitudes against capital punishment unless such be-
liefs or attitudes would render him unable to return a verdict of guilty according to law."
S.C. CoDE ANN. § 16-3-20(E) (Supp. 1983)(emphasis added).
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entiously held views, as the court must do under Allen.77 The
court cited United States v. Rogers78 emphasizing the impor-
tance of a properly stated Allen charge:
Here what was given was not the Allen charge, but only a para-
phrase of that portion of it which directs the attention of the
jurors to their duty to agree, without the reminder of their
duty of dissent if dissent is founded upon reasoned conclusions
reasonably arrived at and reasonably held. Without reference
to both sides of the coin, a strong statement of the duty of
agreement may readily be construed by those jurors in the mi-
nority as requiring a deferential surrender to the views, how-
ever unreasoned they may be, of the majority.7
From Elmore, it is clear that any behavior which may have
the effect of coercing a jury's verdict will not be tolerated. The
judge, a figure of authority, is at the center of the jury's atten-
tion, and they look to him for guidance. That the judge may in-
timidate a single dissenting juror to condemn a prisoner to death
is a dangerous possibility. The courts must beware of any action
which may be interpreted as coercive. This is especially so in a
capital case, for otherwise the requirement that the jury unani-
mously impose sentence would be meaningless.
Ronald Tate, Jr.
77. 279 S.C. at 424, 308 S.E.2d at 786. The instruction approved by the Supreme
Court stated, inter alia, that in many cases absolute certainty could not be expected;
that, although the verdict must be the verdict of each juror and not a mere acquiescence
in the conclusion of the others, they should each examine the question with proper re-
gard and deference to the views of the others; that it is their duty to decide the case if
they can conscientiously do so; that if a much larger number were for conviction a dis-
senting juror should consider whether his doubt was a reasonable one as it made no
impression on the minds of so many men; that if, however, the majority was for acquit-
tal, the minority ought to ask themselves whether they might not reasonably doubt the
correctness of their judgment. 164 U.S. at 501-02.
The Ninth Circuit has held that the Allen charge, without more, stands at the brink
of impermissible coercion, and held it error in a federal prosecution to repeat an Allen
charge after the jury has reported itself deadlocked and has not requested that the in-
struction be repeated. United States v. Seawell, 550 F.2d 1159, 1162-63 (9th Cir.
1977)(citing Sullivan v. United States, 414 F.2d 714 (9th Cir. 1969)).
78. 289 F.2d 433 (4th Cir. 1961).
79. Id. at 436.
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IV. CRIMINAL SEXUAL CONDUCT Is EQUIVALENT TO RAPE AS AN
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE WARRANTING CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
In Elmore, the court also considered the defendant's argu-
ment that because the trial judge charged the jury on "criminal
sexual conduct" instead of common law rape, a death sentence
could not stand. The state death penalty statute refers to "rape"
as an aggravating circumstance of murder which would allow
consideration of the death penalty. 0 "Rape" is, however, no
longer a statutory offense since it has been replaced by the term
"criminal sexual conduct." This problem arises because at the
time the death penalty statute was passed, the former rape stat-
ute was in the South Carolina Code.81 The rape statute essen-
tially embodied common law rape, the elements of which are
carnal knowledge82 without consent 8 and by force."
In 1977 the current criminal sexual conduct statutes re-
pealed the rape statutes and replaced them with three degrees of
sexual offenses. 85 Most significantly, the current statutes define
rape in terms of "sexual battery" which includes "any intrusion,
however slight, of any part of a person's body or of any object
into the genital or anal openings of another person's
body....
Elmore contended that the judge, in charging criminal sex-
ual conduct, failed to charge the elements of "rape" as an aggra-
vating circumstance for which the death penalty may be im-
posed. Rape, he argued, requires the additional element of
penetration by the male sexual organ as necessary for "carnal
knowledge,"87 and penetration must be proven beyond a reason-
able doubt.88 Because the jury was not charged that penetration
must be accomplished by the male organ, an essential element of
80. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(C)(a)(1)(a)(Supp. 1983).
81. "Whosoever shall ravish a woman ... when she did not consent, either before
or after, or ravisheth a woman with force, although she consent after, shall be deemed
guilty of rape." S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-630 (1976).
82. State v. Moorer, 241 S.C. 487, 129 S.E.2d 330 (1963).
83. State v. Whitener, 228 S.C. 244, 89 S.E.2d 701 (1955).
84. State v. Thorne, 239 S.C. 164, 121 S.E.2d 623 (1961).
85. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-3-651 to -730 (Supp. 1983).
86. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-651(h)(Supp. 1983)(emphasis added).
87. Brief of Appellant at 52-53 (citing State v. Tuckness, 257 S.C. 295, 185 S.E.2d
607 (1971)).
88. Brief of Appellant at 54-55 (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979)).
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rape was omitted. The omission was significant because there
was a dispute as to whether the victim had been penetrated by a
male organ or by a foreign object. The defense contended that if
the elements of rape were not properly charged, the aggravating
circumstance of rape could not be found. This argument finds
some support in a 1979 Attorney General's opinion89 which held
that a person could not be disqualified from voting on the basis
of a criminal sexual conduct conviction absent a determination
that the facts on which the person was convicted would have
been sufficient to support a rape conviction. 0 This implies that
criminal sexual conduct is not necessarily synonymous with
rape.
The court summarily disposed of defendant's argument,
stating, "It is evident that it was the intent of the legislature
that these terms ['rape' and 'criminal sexual conduct'] be inter-
changeable and that criminal sexual conduct be an aggravated
[sic] circumstance." '91 The court then stated that "a conviction
of criminal sexual conduct in any degree constitutes the offense
of rape when the facts on which the conviction was based are
sufficient to support a conviction under the previous statutory or
common law offense of rape."92 The court cited State v. Sum-
mers93 which stated that the term "rape" is not used in the cur-
rent statutes, but that the offenses are referred to as "criminal
sexual conduct." 9' There was no discussion in Elmore of the fact
that the current statutes changed the requirement of penetra-
tion. Thus, to achieve the result in Elmore the court implicitly
discarded the requirement of a particular type of penetration re-
quired for common law rape when applied as an aggravating cir-
cumstance in capital crimes. This holding should finally resolve
the confusion caused by references to "rape" in other sections of
the South Carolina Code.
Ronald Tate, Jr.
89. 1979 Op. Att'y Gen. 22, No. 79-12.
90. S.C. CODE ANN. § 7-5-120 (1976) disqualified persons convicted of "rape" from
voting.
91. 279 S.C. at 422, 308 S.E.2d at 785.
92. Id.
93. 276 S.C. 11, 274 S.E.2d 427 (1981).
94. Id. at 13, 274 S.E.2d at 428.
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V. THE STATE HAS No DUTY TO SECURE CUSTODY OVER A
PRISONER HELD IN ANOTHER JURISDICTION FOR POST-CONVICTION
HEARINGS
The South Carolina Supreme Court, in Clayton v. State,9 5
held that a prisoner incarcerated in another jurisdiction for
other crimes has no right to be returned, at the state's expense,
to South Carolina to assert post-conviction claims based on a
conviction in this State. This holding implies that if the prisoner
has a right to assert such claims prior to his release from custody
in another state, he must secure his temporary release96 and fur-
nish his own transportation. This effectively denies prisoners the
right to bring actions under the state Post-Conviction Procedure
Act9 7 until they are brought back to South Carolina to serve
their sentences.
Robert Clyde Clayton was indicted for murder in Spartan-
burg, South Carolina in May 1978. Five months later, he was
convicted of an unrelated federal bank robbery and was sen-
tenced to serve twenty-five years in a federal prison in Pennsyl-
vania. In July 1979 he pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter
on the Spartanburg charge and was sentenced to twenty-four
years to run concurrently with the federal sentence. While serv-
ing his sentence in the federal prison, Clayton sought relief from
the state conviction on the basis of ineffective assistance of
counsel. Because the state refused to bring Clayton back to
South Carolina, he was unable to attend his scheduled eviden-
tiary hearing. Since his public defender could not proceed with-
out him, the action was dismissed without prejudice. The State
contended that as moving party to a civil action, Clayton had
the responsibility to secure his attendance at the hearing,98 and
that the state was without the funds or the statutory authority
95. 278 S.C. 655, 301 S.E.2d 133 (1983).
96. The state argued that Clayton could have applied for a Writ of Habeas Corpus
ad Testificandum to compel his attendance. Brief of Appellant at 5. Literally, the writ
means "you have the body to testify." BLACK'S LAw DICIoNARY 639 (5th ed. 1979). It is
often used to bring a prisoner from one jurisdiction to testify in another, 39 AM. JUR. 2D
Habeas Corpus § 2 (1968), or for production of witnesses in state confinement. See also
Brand v. State, 154 Ga. 781, 270 S.E.2d 206 (1980).
97. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 17-27-10 to -120 (1976).
98. Brief of Respondent at 6.
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to do so. 9
On appeal, the supreme court held that the state has no
duty to secure custody over prisoners held in other jurisdictions
so that they may attend post-conviction hearings.1 00 After citing
authority holding that the prisoner is in fact entitled to an evi-
dentiary hearing,10 1 the court summarily stated that:
[R]espondent does not contend that appellant is not entitled to
an evidentiary hearing. Respondent merely asserts that it does
not have the duty or authority to ensure appellant's presence
at the scheduled hearing. We agree. When appellant returns to
South Carolina, he may reapply for postconviction relief. Then
he will be afforded an evidentiary hearing. 102
The court cited no authority on this point and failed to state
why no duty is imposed upon the state to return a prisoner to
South Carolina when his claims show prima facie constitutional
violations.
1 03
On this question, other jurisdictions resurrect the "in cus-
tody" requirement of habeas corpus relief in applying modern
post-conviction procedure acts. Under this view, the court could
have simply stated that custody by this state was required for
standing. There would have been no need to discuss duty or au-
thority of state officials. In Missouri, the courts hold that under
that state's Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act,1°4 prisoners
in other states 0 5 or in federal penitentiaries within the state"'
have no standing to attack Missouri convictions. "Missouri has
99. 278 S.C. at 657, 301 S.E.2d at 133.
100. Id. at 658, 301 S.E.2d at 134.
101. Norman v. State, 276 S.C. 278, 277 S.E.2d 707 (1981) established that a claim
for ineffective assistance of counsel, unless conclusively refuted by the record, sets forth
a prima facie constitutional violation and entitles the prisoner to an evidentiary hearing.
In McDuflie v. State, 276 S.C. 229, 277 S.E.2d 595 (1981), the court held that a prisoner
is entitled to an evidentiary hearing if he asserts that the results of his South Carolina
conviction persist even after he has served his sentence in this state. For example, a prior
conviction may decrease a prisoner's opportunity for parole or status as trusty in a for-
eign prison.
102. 278 S.C. at 657-58, 301 S.E.2d at 134.
103. The South Carolina Code specifically states: "(a) any person [may institute
proceedings] who has been convicted of, or setenced for, a crime and who claims: (1) that
the conviction or the sentence was in violation of the Constitution of the United States
or the Constitution or laws of this state .... ." S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-20 (1976).
104. Mo. ANN. STAT. Rule 27.26 (Vernon 1983).
105. Wing v. State, 524 S.W.2d 443 (Mo. 1975).
106. Lalla v. State, 463 S.W.2d 797 (Mo. 1971).
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not denied defendant a post-conviction remedy; it has merely
said that, not having him within its custody, a hearing on the
matter will be postponed until he is available (and in custody) in
Missouri. '10 7
If the basis for the court's ruling in Clayton is indeed a lack
of standing, then South Carolina is in the minority. The New
Mexico 108 and Tennessee109 courts hold that an applicant for
post-conviction relief is sufficiently in custody and has standing
to bring a post-conviction action even though incarcerated
outside that state's jurisdiction. In Desmond v. United States
Board of Parole,1 0 the First Circuit held that a prisoner in state
custody had standing under the federal habeas corpus statute1 1
to attack a federal conviction.1 1 2 In these cases, the lack of phys-
ical custody over a prisoner did not bar the prisoner's assertion
of claims.
These decisions failed to consider whether the state has an
affirmative duty to secure custody over the prisoner and bear the
costs of transportation. However, a well-reasoned Florida opin-
ion"" held that a prisoner incarcerated in Texas had standing
under the Florida Post-Conviction Procedure Act 1 4 to attack his
Florida conviction. The court considered the costs to the state
and the potential for abuse by prisoners in securing a day "on
the outside"11 5 at the state's expense. However, the court noted
that safeguards are present in the statute which would allow the
courts to dismiss the petition as frivolous, defective on its face,
or refuted by the record, prior to conducting a hearing.116 Even
107. Id. at 798.
108. State v. Brill, 81 N.M. 785, 474 P.2d 77 (1970), cert. denied, 81 N.M. 784, 474
P.2d 76 (1970).
Although appellant was incarcerated in a federal penitentiary in the State of New
Mexico, he was under the legal custody of the state because of his status as a parolee of
the state penitentiary. The court held that the lack of physical custody by the state of
New Mexico did not bar appellant from seeking post-conviction release. Id. at 787, 474
P.2d at 78.
109. McCray v. State, 504 S.W.2d 773 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1973).
110. 397 F.2d 386 (1st Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 919 (1968).
111. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1976).
112. 397 F.2d at 389.
113. State v. Reynolds, 238 So.2d 598 (Fla. 1970).
114. FLA. R. CrM. P. 3.850.
115. See Brief of Respondent at 5, Reynolds (citing A.B.A. STANDARs RELATNG TO
POST-CoNVIcTION REMEDIES § 4.5).
116. 238 So.2d at 600. This is also possible in South Carolina. See S.C. CODE ANN. §
1984]
23
Tate et al.: Criminal Law
Published by Scholar Commons,
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVEW
if a hearing is granted, the Florida court recognized that the
prisoner's presence is not necessary. The state must secure his
attendance only when factual questions exist which require the
prisoner's live testimony. The appointed counsel is an adequate
substitute for the prisoner in these proceedings.117
Clayton is also contrary to the policy set forth by the
United States Supreme Court in Peyton v. Rowe,118 in which the
Court held that a federal prisoner seeking relief from the second
of two consecutive sentences need not wait until he begins to
actually serve it to commence federal collateral attack.1 9 The
Court noted the possibility of prejudice both to the prisoner and
to the state if a retrial was necessary but was delayed for several
years while the prisoner awaits custody, however fictitious, for
the second sentence. "Common sense dictates that prisoners
seeking habeas corpus relief after exhausting state remedies
should be able to do so at the earliest practicable time.
'120
Eventually, the courts must strike a balance between the
policy of assuring a fair retrial at the earliest possible date and
the strong state interest in not providing out-of-state prisoners
who have frivolous claims a free ride, at the expense of the state,
and a little time on the "outside." The dilemma may not be fully
solved by a standing rule such as the one apparently pro-
pounded in Clayton. Instead, the courts should consider the
merits of each case to determine whether custody and transpor-
tation is warranted. As the Florida court noted, the prisoner
need not always attend these evidentiary hearings, and certainly
the courts may create alternatives to the prisoner's physical
presence, such as depositions or written interrogatories.
The court in Clayton did not weigh these interests. It also
17-27-70(b).
117. 238 So.2d at 600. This is possible because in collateral proceedings, the pres-
ence of the prisoner is within the discretion of the trial court, and no constitutional right
exists to be present at such hearings. See Villarreal v. United States, 508 F.2d 1132 (9th
Cir, 1974).
118. 391 U.S. 54 (1968).
119. 391 U.S. at 67. In doing so, the court overturned McNally v. Hill, 293 U.S. 131
(1934), which held that habeas corpus was premature as the prisoner was not technically
in custody for the second sentence. 391 U.S. at 67.
120. 391 U.S. at 64. In Finklea v. State, 273 S.C. 157, 255 S.E.2d 447, 447-48 (1979),
the court held that the state Post Conviction Procedure Act was designed to incorporate
all rights available under federal habeas corpus relief. Thus, federal habeas corpus prece-
dent is relevant to interpreting the State act.
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failed to examine the more principled arguments, consistent
with its result, which were offered by the Missouri court. In-
stead, it summarily rejected the prisoner's position and provided
no guidance for solving a similar problem when a closer case
arises, as it inevitably must.121 As the law stands in South Caro-
lina, no matter how long the wait or how substantial the grounds
for relief, a prisoner must either begin serving his sentence in
South Carolina or somehow gain temporary release from a for-
eign jurisdiction and transport himself to this state before his
post-conviction action will be heard.
Ronald Tate, Jr.
VI. POST-CONVICTION RELIEF Is NOT AVAILABLE FOR DRIVER'S
LICENSE REVOCATIONS
In Lance v. State, 22 the South Carolina Supreme Court
held that the revocation of a driver's license was not a criminal
sentence which would allow the licensee to bring an action for
post-conviction relief. Within an eighteen month period, Lance
accumulated three convictions for driving under the influence of
alcohol and two convictions for driving with a suspended license.
He was later found an habitual traffic offender under the terms
of the South Carolina Code,' 23 and his license was revoked for
five years. Lance petitioned the courts for post-conviction relief
and received a hearing, at which he contested both the habitual
offender determination and the underlying convictions. The trial
121. For example, a prisoner in another jurisdiction, serving an unrelated sentence,
might discover new evidence absolving him of his South Carolina conviction, but would
be barred from presenting this evidence until he is returned to South Carolina.
122. 279 S.C. 144, 303 S.E.2d 100 (1983).
123. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 56-1-1010 to -1130 (1976).
The Habitual Offender Act requires that the Highway Department keep records of
all traffic offenses and turn over to the solicitor (or to the Attorney General in the case of
a nonresident) the records of those who accumulate a certain number of specifed viola-
tions over a period of time. Id. § 56-1-1030. The solicitor or the Attorney General then
petitions the circuit court for a determination of whether the person is an habitual of-
fender, id. § 56-1-1040, and the court issues a rule to show cause directing the person to
appear at the next session of the Court of General Sessions. Id. § 56-1-1058.
It is anomalous that the statute requires such hearings to be held in the criminal
courts of this state while the supreme court declares that the action is purely civil. At the
same time, the statute provides that appeals may be taken in the same manner as ap-
peals in civil actions. Id. § 56-1-1080.
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judge denied relief, holding that adjudications under the Habit-
ual Offender Act could not be attacked under the State's Uni-
form Post-Conviction Procedure Act.
124
This ruling was affirmed on appeal. The supreme court held
that post-conviction relief may be requested only by one claim-
ing the right to have a sentence for a criminal conviction va-
cated, set aside, or corrected. 125 Revocation of a driver's license
is not a part of the punishment for the underlying offenses.126
In so holding, the court relied on Tutt v. State,1 27 which
held that a circuit court lacked jurisdiction to hear post-convic-
tion claims by prisoners who asserted violations of their consti-
tutional rights when reassigned to other prison facilities, placed
in solitary confinement, or denied medical treatment. These
claims did not pertain to the sentence itself and thus could not
be heard under the Post-Conviction Procedure Act. Also, in
Parker v. State Highway Department1 2s and Finklea v. State,
2 9
the court held that the termination of driving privileges was not
a sentence and could not be collaterally attacked. In Finklea,
the court examined the procedural history of the Post-Convic-
tion Procedure Act and found that the drafters' intent was to
consolidate in one statute those remedies available to challenge
a "sentence of imprisonment."130 Thus, the drafters of the Act
did not contemplate that the statute would be used for any pur-
pose other than to attack criminal convictions.
In Linkous v. Jordan,31 a federal district court held that an
applicant for federal relief from a driver's license revocation had
no standing to claim that his underlying convictions were invalid
for lack of counsel. The court noted that while no person may be
124. Id. §§ 17-27-10 to -120.
125. 279 S.C. at 145, 303 S.E.2d at 101 (citing Rule I of the Uniform Post-Convic-
tion Procedure Act); Tutt v. State, 277 S.C. 525, 290 S.E.2d 414 (1982).
126. 279 S.C. at 145, 303 S.E.2d at 101. See also Johnson v. State, 236 Ga. 370, 223
S.E.2d 808 (1976); Reed v. New York State Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 59 A.D.2d 974, 399
N.Y.S.2d 332 (1977); State v. Carlisle, 285 N.C. 229, 204 S.E.2d 15 (1974); Huffman v.
Commonwealth, 210 Va. 530, 172 S.E.2d 788 (1970)(cases holding that a driver's license
revocation is not a criminal proceeding).
127. 277 S.C. 525, 290 S.E.2d 414 (1982).
128. 224 S.C. 263, 78 S.E.2d 382 (1953).
129. 273 S.C. 157, 255 S.E.2d 447 (1979).
130. Id. at 158, 255 S.E.2d at 447 (citing 11 U.L.A., Post-Conviction Procedure Act,
§ 1, p. 486).
131. 401 F. Supp. 1175 (W.D. Va. 1975).
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imprisoned as a result of any conviction obtained without the
opportunity to be represented,13 2 this defect invalidates only the
sentence, not the conviction. 33 Lance is consistent with this ra-
tionale. If an habitual offender is convicted of driving under rev-
ocation and sentenced to jail, the sentence is derived not from
the prior convictions which made him an habitual offender, but
rather from the fact that the offender violated an injunction
against driving.1 34 The civil penalty of revocation, therefore, car-
ries with it no direct criminal sanctions relating to the underly-
ing offenses.
The revocation of driving privileges is a very serious matter
which may have greater impact on the life of the driver than a
short jail term. In Bell v. Burson,13 5 the United States Supreme
Court recognized the importance of this privilege and held it to
be an entitlement triggering due process guarantees. "Suspen-
sion of issued licenses ... involves state action that adjudicates
important interests of the licensees. In such cases the licenses
are not to be taken away without that procedural due process
required by the fourteenth amendment." ' Bell does not, how-
ever, require a full-dress hearing for all revocations; it requires
only that the hearing be "meaningful" and "appropriate to the
nature of the case. ' 187 In Bell, there was absolutely no opportu-
nity for the driver to defend himself and dispute either the revo-
cation or the claims underlying it. When a state revokes a li-
cense under the Habitual Offender Act, however, it does so on
the basis of actions which have already been adjudicated in pro-
ceedings which themselves fulfilled due process guarantees.138
132. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
133. Marston v. Oliver, 485 F.2d 705 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 936
(1974).
134. Cf. Mays v. Harris, 523 F.2d 1258 (4th Cir. 1975), which relied on the rationale
of Walker v. Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967), reh'g denied, 389 U.S. 894 (1967) (while
an injunction may have been issued illegally, it must still be respected).
135. 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
136. Id. at 539. Bell concerned an attempt by the state to revoke the license of an
uninsured driver automatically upon involvement in an accident. In order to satisfy due
process requirements, the hearing required by Bell must address the issue of the driver's
liability in the accident.
137. Id. at 541-42.
138. In Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105 (1977), the Court held valid the Illinois Habit-
ual Traffic Offender Statute. This law allowed the Secretary of State to act without a
preliminary hearing in revoking licenses upon a showing by records or other evidence
that the license had accumulated sufficient "points." The Court held that while Bell
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Therefore, case law strongly supports the result in Lance.
Adjudication as an habitual offender is not part of the sentence
for the underlying crimes, but is collateral to those convictions.
While the loss of a driver's license for a long period of time may
have a tremendous effect on lifestyle and livelihood, the fact re-
mains that revocation is a separate civil matter governed by its
own procedural guarantees under the Habitual Offender Act.
Ronald Tate, Jr.
VII. COURT APPROVES ABA PROCEDURES FOR DEALING WITH
DEFENDANTS' PERJURED TESTIMONY
In re Goodwin 89 concerned the proper course of conduct for
a criminal defense attorney upon learning of his client's inten-
tion to commit perjury during trial. The attorney moved to be
relieved of her duties, but the trial court denied her motion to
withdraw. Upon the attorney's refusal to proceed with the de-
fense, she was held in contempt. The South Carolina Supreme
Court affirmed both the order and the contempt citation, but
because this was a case of first impression and the attorney ac-
ted in good faith, no sanctions were imposed.
For such situations, the court approved ABA standards
140
whereby the attorney is to counsel the client against perjuring
himself. If the client insists upon testifying, the attorney must
allow him to make a narrative statement. The attorney may not
ask direct questions on the perjured subject matter, and may not
refer to the false testimony in closing arguments. The court rec-
ognized that there are no ideal solutions for this problem, but
determined that this procedure best balances the attorney's eth-
ical duty to the court and to the client by appearing not to sub-
orn perjury while still offering the defendant his right to coun-
sel. 141 For a full discussion of this case, see the Professional
applies the due process clause to revocations, Illinois could provide all safeguards re-
quired by the constitution by making available an administrative, rather than a judicial,
hearing within a reasonable period of time. 431 U.S. at 113. In light of Love, the South
Carolina statute affords the licensee greater protection than is required under the federal
constitution.
139. 279 S.C. 274, 305 S.E.2d 578 (1983).
140. STANDARDS RUA.nGo TO TE DEFSNSME FUNCTION § 7.7.
141. 279 S.C. at 277, 305 S.E.2d at 580.
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Responsibility section of this Survey.142
Ronald Tate, Jr.
VIII. PROOF OF ACTUAL DELINQUENCY UNNECESSARY IN
PROSECUTION FOR CONTRIBUTING TO THE DELINQUENCY OF A
MINOR
In State v. Rodriguez,4 3 the South Carolina Supreme Court
held that a person may be found guilty of contributing to the
delinquency of a minor even though the minor resists the de-
fendant's advances and does not "wilfully injure her morals. '144
In so doing, the court has inferentially construed South Caro-
lina's "contributing to the delinquency of a minor" statute to
require no allegations or proof that the child has actually be-
come "delinquent" in order to establish the crime.
The appellant in Rodriguez was convicted of contributing to
the delinquency of a fourteen-year-old girl.1 45 The charge
stemmed from an incident occurring at Beaufort Naval Hospital,
where Rodriguez was an employee and where the child was recu-
perating from an appendectomy. According to the testimony in-
troduced at trial, Rodriguez made an unauthorized visit to the
child's room, and grasping the child's arm, forced her to touch
his private parts. 48 The child testified that when she realized
exactly what the appellant was doing, she immediately pulled
her hand away.L
47
After moving unsuccessfully for a directed verdict, Rodri-
guez offered no testimony on his own behalf and was convicted
of the charge of contributing to the delinquency of a minor. He
appealed, contending that the trial judge erred in refusing to di-
142. See infra at pp. 231-43.
143. 279 S.C. 106, 302 S.E.2d 666 (1983).
144. Id. at 109, 302 S.E.2d at 667.
145. Id. at 107, 302 S.E.2d at 666. The appellant was also convicted of committing a
lewd act upon a twelve-year-old girl who shared a room with the fourteen-year-old com-
plainant. With respect to the twelve-year-old, the appellant was charged under the "lewd
act" statute, S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-140 (1976). See Record at 95. The appellant was not
charged under this provision with respect to both girls because the "lewd act" statute is
expressly applicable only to those committing such acts upon children under the age of
fourteen years. 279 S.C. at 108 n.1, 302 S.E.2d at 667 n.1.
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rect a verdict.48 The appellant argued that, as a matter of law,
he could not be found guilty under a proper interpretation of
South Carolina's "contributing" statute."" The statute provides
in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person over eighteen years of age
to knowingly and wilfully encourage, aid or cause to do any act
which shall cause or influence a minor:
(10) To so deport himself or herself as to wilfully injure or en-
danger his or her morals or health or the morals or health of
others.10
The appellant argued that since the child had resisted his lewd
advances and had never "wilfully" injured her morals in any
way, he had not contributed to the child's delinquency. The
South Carolina Supreme Court rejected this contention and up-
held the conviction. Finding that the South Carolina legislature
did not intend that the statute "apply only when the minor is a
willing participant, 15 1 the court concluded that since the defen-
dant had in fact "encouraged" the child to wilfully injure her
morals, that is, to become "delinquent," he could be found guilty
of contributing to the child's delinquency regardless of whether
the child actually cooperated.
1 52
By resolving the question of whether the criminal offense of
contributing to the delinquency of a minor requires the allega-
tion or proof of resulting "delinquency" on the part of the minor
against the defendant, the supreme court has joined the trend in
148. Brief of Appellant at 1. The appellant also contended that the state court lack-
ed jurisdiction over crimes committed at Beaufort Naval Hospital, a federal military in-
stallation. Supplemental Brief of Appellant at 1. The supreme court rejected this conten-
tion, holding that the state court properly exercised concurrent jurisdiction over the
crime. The federal government had never accepted exclusive jurisdiction, as required by
40 U.S.C. § 255 (1970), which deprives the state of jurisdiction over land acquired by the
federal government after 1940. The United States acquired the hospital in 1946. 279 S.C.
at 107, 302 S.E.2d at 666-67. The appellant further argued that the trial judge commit-
ted reversible error in denying the appellant's motion that he be allowed to attend the
sounding of the jury venire. Brief of Appellant at 4. The court dismissed this contention
as well, holding that the appellant failed to present a record adequate for review of this
issue. 279 S.C. at 109, 302 S.E.2d at 667.
149. Brief of Appellant at 2-4.
150. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-17-490 (Supp. 1983).
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a growing number of jurisdictions which have construed similar
statutes in a liberal fashion.153 For example, in State v. Wor-
ley,'" the North Carolina Court of Appeals rejected a similar
argument that actual "delinquency" must be proven, and in-
stead stated: "It seems clear that the legislative intent was to
protect children from wrongful influence by adults, and that in
protection of minors the state should not await the result of the
wrong perpetrated before punishing the offender." 155
It is important to note, however, that none of the statutes
found in the other jurisdictions contain precisely the same lan-
guage found in section 16-17-490(10). A number of these stat-
utes prohibit encouraging a child's delinquency5 " or causing or
tending to cause such delinquency.157 None of the statutes, how-
153. See Smithson v. State, 34 Ala. App. 343, 39 So.2d 678 (1949)(guilt of accused
did not depend on proof of acquiescience or delinquency of victim); State v. Hunt, 8
Ariz. App. 514, 447 P.2d 896 (1968) (allegations and/or proof of delinquency not neces-
sary under Arizona statute); Williams v. City of Malvern, 222 Ark. 432, 261 S.W.2d 6
(1953) (because legislative intent was to protect the young and innocent from evil influ-
ence, no proof of delinquency is necessary); State v. Scallan, 201 La. 1026, 10 So.2d 885
(1942)(under the Louisiana statute, parents may be guilty of a misdemeanor for allowing
certain conduct of their children, although no delinquency results); People v. Owens, 13
Mich. App. 469, 164 N.W.2d 712 (1968)(no adjudication of delinquency is necessary to
find accused "tend[ed] to cause" a minor to become delinquent); State v. Vachon, 113
N.H. 239, 306 A.2d 781 (1973), reo'd on other grounds, 414 U.S. 478 (1974)(state need
only prove that the conduct of the accused could reasonably be found to contribute to
causing delinquency; adjudication of delinquency not necessary); State v. Norflett, 67
N.J. 268, 337 A.2d 609 (1975)(no actual finding of delinquency necessary); State v.
Favela, 91 N.M. 476, 576 P.2d 282 (1978)(if the contributing to the delinquency statute
applied only when the child committed a "delinquent act," there would be no need for
its existence); State v. Worley, 13 N.C. App. 198, 185 S.E.2d 270 (1971)(generally ac-
cepted view is that contributing to delinquency statutes are preventative as well as puni-
tive; thus proof of actual delinquency is not necessary); Wallin v. State, 84 Okla Crim.
194, 182 P.2d 788 (Okla Crim. App. 1947) (court liberally construes "encourage" in order
to bring accused under the statute); State v. Williams, 236 Or. 18, 386 P.2d 461 (1963)(a
showing that defendant's conduct tended to cause delinquency held to be sufficient);
Commonwealth v. Marlin, 452 Pa. 380, 305 A.2d 14 (1973)(protective nature of statute
eliminates need for proof of actual delinquency); Lovvorn v. State, 215 Tenn. 659, 389
S.W.2d 252 (1965)(liberal construction of "encourage" will fulfill preventive purpose of
statute); State v. Austin, 234 S.E.2d 657 (W. Va. 1977)(not necessary to show defendant's
conduct actually resulted in delinquency); see generally, Annot., 18 A.L.R.3d 824 (1968
& Supp. 1982).
154. 13 N.C. App. 198, 185 S.E.2d 270 (1971).
155. Id. at 200, 185 S.E.2d at 271.
156. See, e.g., State v. Norflett, 67 N.J. 268, 337 A.2d 609 (1975)(interpreting N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2A: 96-4 (West 1969), which was repealed in 1979; in its stead is § 2C: 24-4
(West 1982), which does not mention "delinquency").
157. See, e.g., State v. Favela, 91 N.M. 475, 576 P.2d 282 (1978)(interpreting N.M.
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ever, forbid only the encouragement of acts "which shall cause
or influence" a child to "wilfully injure or endanger his or her
morals."1 8
In resolving the issue against the appellant in Rodriguez,
the court raised the problem of fair notice. It is well established
that a criminal statute which "fails to give a person of ordinary
intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbid-
den" consequently fails to comport with due process, and a con-
viction thereunder cannot be sustained.159 If a statute is capable
of more than one reasonable interpretation, conviction for the
crime therein may violate the defendant's right to be put on no-
tice of what constitutes criminal conduct and what does not, at
least in the absence of previous judicial interpretation of the
statute.160
The prohibition against contributing to the delinquency of a
minor under section 16-17-490(10) is plainly capable of more
than one reasonable interpretation. The court in Rodriguez con-
strued the statute to prohibit the "encouragement," that is, "so-
licitation," of a minor to become delinquent. An equally reason-
able interpretation is that the statute, by employing the
expression "any act which shall cause," contemplates some ac-
tual consequence of the defendant's conduct.""1 It would be ludi-
crous to contend that the appellant believed that his conduct
was in any manner lawful; however, when a criminal statute does
not explicitly spell out what activity is prohibited, convicting a
person on such grounds may be violative of due process."6 2 Al-
though recognizing the spirit of the law, the court stretches stat-
utory construction to its limits.
STAT. ANN. § 30.6-3 (1978)).
158. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-17-490(10) (Supp. 1983).
159. United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 123 (1979) (quoting United States v.
Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954)).
160. See Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399 (1966); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S.
360 (1964); Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939). See also State v. Solomon, 245
S.C. 550, 141 S.E.2d 818 (1965)(Sunday closing law held not unconstitutionally vague).
161. At least two other states have construed their "contributing" statutes to re-
quire that the state actually prove resulting "delinquency." See Spencer v. People, 133
Colo. 196, 292 P.2d 971 (1956); Dabney v. State, 143 Ga. App. 655, 239 S.E.2d 698 (1977).
162. This argument was raised by the appellant in Rodriguez. Nevertheless, it is
worthy of note that some courts have struck down such statutes altogether as being un-
constitutionally vague. See State v. Vallery, 212 La. 1095, 34 So. 2d 329 (1948); State v.
Hodges, 254 Or. 21, 457 P.2d 491 (1969); State v. Gallegos, 384 P.2d 967 (Wyo.
1963)(held unconstitutional under Wyoming statute).
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More child protection statutes are certainly needed, and
those existing perhaps should be liberally construed.6 3 In so do-
ing, however, the court must refrain from implicating the funda-
mental right of fair notice mandated by the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment.
Robert C. Byrd
IX. ADMISSIBILITY OF INCULPATORY CODEFENDANT CONFESSIONS
IN JOINT TRIALS UNDER THE "INTERLOCKING CONFESSIONS"
DOCTRINE
The sixth and fourteenth amendments of the United States
Constitution guarantee every defendant in a criminal trial the
right to confront any person who makes an accusation of crimi-
nal conduct against him."" This fundamental right of confronta-
tion necessarily includes the right of the criminal defendant to
cross-examine his accuser so that he may challenge the veracity
of the accusations.6 5 This basic constitutional guarantee may be
effectively frustrated when, in a joint trial, those accusations are
in the form of extrajudicial statements of a non-testifying code-
fendant. When such statements are admitted into evidence, even
with explicit instructions that they be used only against the co-
defendant who made them, the sixth amendment rights of the
remaining defendant who is implicated by those statements may
be contravened if the accusing codefendant refuses to take the
stand.1 66
In State v. Thompson,167 the South Carolina Supreme
Court carved out an exception to the general rule that admitting
inculpatory statements of a nontestifying codefendant in a joint
trial violates the sixth amendment rights of the remaining impli-
163. See Wallin v. State, 84 Okla. Crim. 194, 201, 182 P.2d 788, 792 (1947)("[a]
liberal interpretation of the juvenile delinquency statutes arms the state with a two-
edged sword, to protect children not delinquent from the suggestions of delinquency, as
well as for the punishment of those who might commit such acts as to a child already
delinquent").
164. The sixth amendment provides that, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right.., to be confronted with the witnesses against him ... ." U.S.
CONsT. amend. VI. This right is protected against state action by the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
165. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
166. See Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
167. 279 S.C. 405, 308 S.E.2d 364 (1983).
19841
33
Tate et al.: Criminal Law
Published by Scholar Commons,
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
cated defendant.168 The court in Thompson held that a defen-
dant's confrontation rights are not violated by the admission of
a nontestifying codefendant's inculpatory statements where the
defendant alleging the violation has himself made an incriminat-
ing statement, the defendant's statement is "interlocking to a
substantial degree" with those of his co-defendant, and the trial
judge has instructed the jury that it may not consider the code-
fendant's statements in determining the guilt or innocence of
the remaining defendant. 1 9
The appellant in Thompson was charged with the crimes of
accessory before and after the fact of the murder of her hus-
band. The appellant's codefendant McCurry was charged with
first degree murder. Prior to their joint trial, Thompson and Mc-
Curry made separate statements to the police recounting the
events leading up to and immediately following the fatal shoot-
ing of Thompson's husband. The pre-trial statements of both
defendants did corroborate each other in some respects. 170 How-
ever, neither defendant expressly admitted guilt,17 1 and natu-
rally each defendant tended to shift the blame for the death to
the other.172
The appellant Thompson moved for severance of the joint
trial and also for the suppression of her codefendant's pre-trial
statement, which implicated her as an accessory to a much
greater degree than did her own statement. 73 Denying both mo-
tions, the trial judge allowed McCurry's statement to be admit-
ted into evidence; however, it was accompanied by instructions
168. See Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
169. 279 S.C. at 407, 308 S.E.2d at 366.
170. The court noted three salient points of similarity between the two pre-trial
statements: "Each admits to having discussed the murder of appellants husband[,]...
[e]ach states that McCurry told appellant that he planned to kill appellant's husband
immediately prior to the crime[,] ... [and] [a]ccording to both accounts, McCurry hid
in appellant's bedroom after the murder." Id.
171. Record at 106-17. McCurry maintained that the shooting was accidental. Id. at
115.
172. The appellant's pre-trial statement depicts McCurry as the sole perpetrator of
the murder and describes her own repeated attempts to dissuade her lover from carrying
out his threats to kill her husband. Record at 106-11. She furthermore attributed her
own complicity in the crime to fear that McCurry would harm her if she did not cooper-
ate. Id. at 107-08. On the other hand, according to McCurry's statement the plan to
murder the appellant's husband was arrived at mutually, and it was the appellant who
actually suggested the date upon which the crime was to be executed. Id. at 112-17.
173. See supra note 172.
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to the jury that the statement could be considered only in deter-
mining the guilt or innocence of McCurry and could not be used
against Thompson. Since McCurry refused to take the stand at
trial, Thompson never had an opportunity to cross-examine her
codefendant concerning the inculpatory remarks in his pre-trial
statement.
Convicted of the accessory charge, Thompson contended on
appeal that the admission of her codefendant's extrajudicial
statement in their joint trial violated her sixth amendment right
to confront witnesses against her.174 The South Carolina Su-
preme Court rejected this contention, holding instead that since
the appellant had also made an incriminating statement which
was "interlocking to a substantial degree" with her codefend-
ant's statement, the admission of McCurry's statement along
with properly limiting instructions to the jury did not violate the
appellant's sixth amendment right of confrontation.175
The appellant in Thompson relied primarily upon the
landmark decision of Bruton v. United States, e in which the
United States Supreme Court established the general rule re-
garding the admissibility of nontestifying codefendant confes-
sions in joint trials. In Bruton, a postal service inspector testi-
fied in a joint trial for armed postal robbery that one of two
nontestifying codefendants had confessed and had implicated
the remaining defendant, Bruton, in the crime as well. The
Court held that admitting testimony regarding the codefend-
174. The appellant's challenge was actually on the ground that the trial judge com-
mitted reversible error in denying the appellant's motion for severance of the joint trial.
Brief of Appellant at 2. The supreme court handily rejected this contention, concluding
that the appellant failed to establish abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge in
his refusal to sever. 279 S.C. at 408, 308 S.E.2d at 366.
The appellant also demanded reversal on the ground that the trial judge erred in
denying the appellants motion for a directed verdict on the charge of accessory before
the fact since there was insufficient evidence to raise any reasonable inference that the
appellant "aided, procured, or encouraged the commission of the felony." Brief of Appel-
lant at 9. The supreme court held that evidence as to the accessory charge was sufficient
to send the question to the jury, particularly in light of the amorous relationship be-
tween the appellant and her codefendant and the obvious motive to rid the appellant of
her husband. 279 S.C. at 408, 308 S.E.2d at 366. Apparently the evidence consisted of a
remark made by the appellant to McCurry approximately one week prior to the crime,
that, "If you're going to do it [commit the murder] just do it, I don't want to know about
it." Id.
175. 279 S.C. at 407, 308 S.E.2d at 366.
176. 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
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ant's inculpatory statement in the joint trial violated Bruton's
sixth amendment right of confrontation, despite the trial judge's
instructions limiting the jury's use of the confession.
17 7
Instead of applying the Bruton rule, however, the court in
State v. Thompson adopted what has become generally known
as the "interlocking confessions" exception. 178 The court cited as
controlling authority the recent decision of the United States
Supreme Court in Parker v. Randolph,79 in which a plurality of
the justices similarly recognized this exception to the Bruton
rule.180 In Parker, a joint trial, the trial court admitted into evi-
dence the confessions of other nontestifying codefendants, all of
which tended to implicate the remaining defendant, Randolph,
as well. Unlike the defendant in Bruton, however, Randolph had
already admitted his own participation in the crime and this
confession had already been introduced into evidence. In a plu-
rality opinion authored by Justice Rehnquist, four justices of the
Supreme Court held that Randolph's sixth amendment right of
confrontation was not violated by the admission of his nontesti-
fying codefendants' confessions since he had confessed, the con-
fessions were interlocking, and the trial judge had issued prop-
erly limiting instructions to the jury.81
Although the "interlocking confessions" exception to the
Bruton rule has been endorsed by only a plurality of the Su-
preme Court, its adoption by the court in State v. Thompson is
not surprising. Most jurisdictions which have addressed the is-
sue have similarly recognized such an exception.182 However, the
177. Id. at 137.
178. The phrase "interlocking confessions" can be attributed to the decision in
United States ex rel. Catanzaro v. Mancusi, 404 F.2d 296 (2d Cir. 1968), where the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit stated: "In our case Catanzaro himself confessed and
his confession interlocks and supports the confession of [his codefendant] ...... Id. at
300.
179. 442 U.S. 62 (1979).
180. Id. at 75 (plurality).
181. Id. at 254. Only four of the eight participating justices recognized the "inter-
locking confessions" exception. The remaining four applied the Bruton rule, as tempered
by Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250 (1969). In Harrington, the Court held that a
Bruton violation will not require reversal of a conviction if it is "harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt." Id. Justice Blackmun, who concurred in the Parker judgment, re-
jected the "interlocking confessions" exception applied by the plurality, although he
found that the Bruton violation "clearly was harmless." 442 U.S. at 80 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring).
182. Cases which have applied the "interlocking confessions" exception include:
[Vol. 36
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South Carolina Supreme Court's application of this exception to
the particular circumstances in Thompson suggests that the
court has a basic misunderstanding of the rationale underlying
the exception.
The constitutionality of admitting inculpatory confessions
of nontestifying codefendants in a joint trial depends in large
part upon the adequacy of limiting instructions in properly safe-
guarding the remaining defendant's confrontation rights. The
Supreme Court has unequivocally stated that, at least where the
remaining defendant has not confessed to the criminal activity,
such "limiting" instructions do not provide sufficient protection,
as "[t]he effect is the same as if there had been no instructions
at all."183 In concluding that the same instructions do constitute
an adequate safeguard in those situations in which the defen-
dant has expressly admitted his own guilt, the plurality in
Parker reasoned:
[T]he incriminating statements of a codefendant will seldom, if
ever, be of the "devastating" character referred to in Bruton
when the incriminated defendant has admitted his own guilt.
The right protected by Bruton ... has far less practical value
to a defendant who has confessed to the crime than to one who
has consistently maintained his innocence. 1
In applying the "interlocking confessions" exception in
Thompson, the court has ignored the rationale set forth above,
thus failing to adequately protect the criminal defendant's sixth
amendment right of confrontation. The court applied the excep-
Tamilio v. Fogg, 713 F.2d 18 (2d Cir. 1983); Mack v. Maggio, 538 F.2d 1129 (5th Cir.
1976); State v. Gerlaugh, 134 Ariz. 164, 654 P.2d 800 (1982); Stewart v. State, 257 Ark.
753, 519 S.W.2d 733 (1975); Damon v. State, 397 So.2d 1224 (Fla. App. 1981); Tatum v.
State, 249 Ga. 422, 291 S.E.2d 701 (1982); People v. Davis, 97 IU.2d 1, 452 N.E.2d 525
(1983); Montes v. State, 263 Ind. 390, 332 N.E.2d 786 (1975); Bunton v. Commonwealth,
464 S.W.2d 810 (Ky. 1971); State v. Hopper, 253 La. 439, 218 So.2d 551 (1969); State v.
Bleyl, 435 A.2d 1349 (Me. 1981); People v. Hartford, 117 Mich. App. 413, 324 N.W.2d 31
(1982); State v. Hall, 185 Neb. 653, 178 N.W.2d 268 (1970); People v. Smalls, 55 N.Y.2d
407, 434 N.E.2d 1063, 449 N.Y.S.2d 696 (1982); State v. Gray, 628 S.W.2d 746 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1981); and State v. Aiken, 75 Wash. 2d 421, 452 P.2d 232 (1969).
Cases which have expressly rejected the interlocking confessions exception include:
United States v. Ruff, 717 F.2d 855 (3d Cir. 1983); United States v. Parker, 622 F.2d 298
(8th Cir. 1980); Quick v. State, 599 P.2d 712 (Alaska 1979); State v. Rodriguez, 226 Kan.
558, 601 P.2d 686 (1979); and Earhart v. State, 48 Md. App. 695, 429 A.2d 557 (1981).
183. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 137 (1968).
184. 442 U.S. at 73 (plurality).
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tion to a situation in which the implicated defendant had not
actually confessed to the crime with which she was charged, but
had at most made only vaguely incriminating remarks.185 Unless
the "interlocking confessions" doctrine is indeed a misnomer,
the South Carolina Supreme Court has extended the exception
beyond its contemplated parameters.
Although the plurality in Parker failed to define "confes-
sion," it is obvious that the situation in which the application of
the exception to the Bruton rule was contemplated was one in
which the defendant's "own admission of guilt stands before the
jury unchallenged."186 One of the necessary assumptions of the
"interlocking confessions" exception is that a defendant who has
confessed has little practical use for cross-examining his code-
fendant's testimony. Since "one can scarcely imagine evidence
more damaging to [the accused's] defense than his own admis-
sion of guilt," 187 the prejudicial impact of a codefendant's accu-
sations is negligible. Accordingly, the "interlocking confessions"
exception to Bruton appears to be inapplicable unless "the in-
criminated defendant has corroborated his codefendant's state-
ments by heaping blame onto himself."188
The appellant in Thompson never expressly admitted her
guilt to the accessory crime charged.189 Therefore, her pre-trial
statement was not a "confession," particularly in light of State
v. Cunningham,00 in which the South Carolina Supreme Court
restricted the definition of "confession" to the " 'acknowledge-
ment of guilt, and . . .not ... mere statement of fact from
which guilt may be inferred.' "191 The "incriminating" statement
which Thompson admittedly made was a far cry from "heaping
blame" upon herself, as contemplated by the Parker plurality.
By broadening the scope of the "interlocking confessions" excep-
tion to encompass vaguely incriminating remarks, the court has
apparently chosen to disregard the comparatively narrow appli-
185. See supra notes 171-79. The court in Thompson at one point referred to "con-
fessions or incriminating statements." 279 S.C. at 30, 308 S.E.2d at 366.
186. See 442 U.S. at 73 (plurality).
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
190. 275 S.C. 189, 268 S.E.2d 289 (1980).
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cation of the same exception endorsed in Parker,192 and to disre-
gard the rationale behind that decision.
Finally, assuming that the court justifiably extended the ap-
plication of the "interlocking confessions" exception to merely
"incriminating statements," the court in Thompson nevertheless
failed to employ any legally recognized standard for determining
whether the two pre-trial statements were in fact "interlock-
ing."193 Although the plurality in Parker v. Randolph again
failed to define an important term, the Court seems to have re-
lied upon the lower court's finding that the confessions "clearly
demonstrated the involvement of each [defendant], as to crucial
facts such as time, location, felonious activity, and awareness of
the overall plan or scheme."''
The plurality opinion in Parker as well as subsequent lower
court decisions clearly suggest that in order to be "interlocking"
the statements must do more than simply "support each other
in several respects." The Maine Supreme Judicial Court has co-
gently defined the requisite connection as follows: "[T]he con-
fessions, to 'interlock', should be substantially similar and con-
sistent on the major elements of the crime; in particular, the
motive, plotting and execution of the crime." 1'5 Similarly, the
Arizona Supreme Court has stated: "Confessions interlock if
they are consistent on the major elements of the crime and there
is nothing in the codefendant's confession that implicates the
defendant any more in the commission of the crime than did the
defendant's own confession."'
In People v. Smalls,197 the defendant, who was implicated
192. See Parker, 442 U.S. at 75-76 n.8, where the plurality attempted to distinguish
an earlier decision on the grounds that the defendant's statement in the prior case,
"while inculpatory, was by no stretch of the imagination a 'confession'." Id. Contra
Tatum v. State, 249 Ga. 422, 291 S.E.2d 701 (1982).
193. The court simply concluded that the statements are "interlocking to a substan-
tial degree," presumably because they "support each other in several respects." 279 S.C.
at 407, 308 S.E.2d at 366. See supra note 170.
194. 442 U.S. at 67-68 (plurality).
195. State v. Bleyl, 435 A.2d 1349, 1364 (Me. 1981).
196. State v. Gerlaugh, 134 Ariz. 164, 168, 654 P.2d 800, 804 (1982). See also State v.
Gray, 628 S.W.2d 746, 749 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981). The court stated that unless "the
confession of one non-testifying codefendant contradicts, repudiates or adds to material
statements in the confession of the other non-testifying codefendant so as to expose the
latter to increased risk of conviction or to an increase in the degree of the offense with
correspondingly greater punishment," no Bruton problem occurs.
197. 55 N.Y.2d 407, 434 N.E.2d 1063, 449 N.Y.S.2d 696 (1982).
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by his codefendant's extrajudicial statement as a knowing par-
ticipant in the commission of a robbery, had also made a pre-
trial statement in which he described in detail the events of the
crime. The defendant admitted only that he was present at the
crime scene and not that he had participated in, or was even
aware of, the events as they transpired around him. The New
York Court of Appeals held that the statements were not "inter-
locking," reasoning: "The only statements made by Smalls even
arguably indicating such awareness [of criminal activity] were
ambiguous at best. The danger is great that the jury might have
resolved these ambiguities by reference to [the codefendant's]
statement ... "1,,11
In light of the foregoing, the court's conclusion that the two
pre-trial statements in Thompson were "interlocking to a sub-
stantial degree" appears to be untenable. The statements simply
were not consistent on the major elements of the crime with
which the appellant was charged.199 While it does not appear
from the appellant's pre-trial statement that she wilfully "aided,
procured or encouraged" the commission of the murder, the pre-
trial statement of her codefendant clearly suggests the con-
trary.200 Furthermore, the court's attempt to rationalize its re-
sult by announcing that "[s]light disparities are rarely so preju-
dicial as to require exclusion" is unpersuasive, particularly since
the court fails to adequately explain what constitutes a "slight
disparity."20'
It is conceded that the inherent suspicion of a codefendant's
accusations becomes attenuated when the remaining defendant
who is implicated has confessed to the crime with which he has
been charged. The same result, however, is not achieved when
the defendant has not "heaped blame onto himself," but rather
has, at most, made vaguely incriminating remarks. Where, as in
198. Id. at -, 434 N.E.2d at 1067, 449 N.Y.S.2d at 700.
199. The elements of the offense of accessory before the fact are: (1) the accused
advises and agrees, urges, or aids the principal to commit an offense, (2) the accused is
not present when the crime is committed, and (3) the principal commits the crime. State
v. Fame, 190 S.C. 75, 1 S.E.2d 912 (1939). The elements of the offense of accessory after
the fact are: (1) the crime is complete, (2) the accused has knowledge that the principal
committed the crime, and (3) the accused harbors or assists the principal. State v. Plath,
277 S.C. 126, 284 S.E.2d 221 (1981).
200. See supra note 172.
201. See 279 S.C. at 407, 308 S.E.2d at 366.
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State v. Thompson, the defendant's own incriminating state-
ment alone might not be sufficiently compelling to secure the
defendant's conviction, the cumulative impact of a nontestifying
codefendant's blameshifting poses a serious danger to the re-
maining defendant's right of confrontation.0 2 Moreover, it can-
not naively be assumed that such a prejudicial impact will be
neutralized by limiting jury instructions.203
Therefore, it is to be hoped that the South Carolina Su-
preme Court will reevaluate its broad, wholesale application of
the "interlocking confessions" exception and accordingly restrict
the scope of that exception so that it will comply with the strin-
gent requirements of the sixth amendment. The very narrow ex-
ception to the strong rule of Bruton carved out in Parker ap-
pears to mandate such a reconsideration.
Robert C. Byrd
X. CONVICTIONS FOR RAPE AND KIDNAPPING, THE LATTER BEING
MERELY INCIDENTAL TO THE FORMER, Do NOT CONSTITUTE
DOUBLE JEOPARDY
The defendant in State v. Hall 2°4 was convicted of first de-
gree criminal sexual conduct, assault and battery of a high and
aggravated nature, and kidnapping. Although all three charges
arose from the same incident, the South Carolina Supreme
Court affirmed all the convictions and the consecutive sentences
202. See generally 442 U.S. at 79 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun
stated:
The fact that confessions may interlock to some degree does not ensure, as a
per se matter, that their admission will not prejudice a defendant so substan-
tially that a limiting instruction will not be curative.... Although two inter-
locking confessions may not be internally inconsistent, one may go far beyond
the other in implicating the confessor's codefendant.
Id. at 79.
203. See Bruton, 391 U.S. at 123.
[T]here are some contexts in which the risk that the jury will not, or cannot,
follow instructions is so great, and the consequences of failure so vital to the
defendant, that the practical and human limitations of the jury system cannot
be ignored .... Such a context is presented here, where the powerfully in-
criminating extrajudicial statements of a codefendant, who stands accused
side-to-side with the defendant, are deliberately spread before the jury in a
joint trial.
Id. at 135-36. See also id. at 132 n.8.
204. 280 S.C. 74, 310 S.E.2d 429 (1983).
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imposed therefor. In so holding, the court specifically rejected
the contention that the convictions constitute double jeopardy,
and further held that in order to establish kidnapping, the state
is not obligated to prove that the confining and carrying away of
the victim was more than merely incident to the commission of
another crime.20 5
The defendant, Benjamin Allen Hall, approached the victim
from behind and knocked her to the ground, threatening to use
a knife which he held to the victim's throat if she screamed. The
assailant walked the victim from a phone booth in front of an
apartment complex to an adjacent swimming pool area, where he
forced her to perform fellatio upon him. He then made her move
to the diving board, where he performed cunnilingus upon her.
The defendant then moved her to an alleyway in the pool area
and twice engaged in sexual intercourse with the victim. Approx-
imately forty-five minutes after initially seizing her, Hall re-
leased the victim.
206
The defendant was charged with and convicted of four
counts of first degree criminal sexual assault,0 7 of assault and
battery of a high and aggravated nature2
08 and of kidnapping.20 9
205. Id. at 76-78, 310 S.E.2d at 431-32.
206. Id. at 75-76, 310 S.E.2d at 430.
207. Criminal sexual conduct in the first degree is defined as follows:
(1) A person is guilty of criminal sexual conduct in the first degree if the actor
engages in sexual battery with the victim and if any one or more of the follow-
ing circumstances are proven:
(a) The actor uses aggravated force to accomplish sexual battery.
(b) The victim submits to sexual battery by the actor under circum-
stances where the victim is also the victim of forcible confinement, kid-
napping, robbery, extortion, burglary, housebreaking, or any other simi-
lar offense or act.
(2) Criminal sexual conduct in the first degree is a felony punishable by im-
prisonment for not more than thirty years, according to the discretion of the
court.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-652 (Supp. 1983)(emphasis added).
208. Assault and battery of a high and aggravated nature, a common law offense in
South Carolina, is defined as
an unlawful act of violent injury to the person of another, accompanied by
circumstances of aggravation, such as the use of a deadly weapon, the infliction
of serious bodily injury, the intent to commit a felony, the great disparity be-
tween the ages and physical conditions of the parties, a difference in [the]
sexes, indecent liberties or familiarities with a female, the purposeful infliction
of shame and disgrace, resistance of lawful authority, and others.
State v. Johson, 187 S.C. 439, 441-42, 198 S.E. 1, 2 (1938) (quoting State v. Jones, 133
S.C. 167, 181, 130 S.E. 747, 751 (1925)). See also State v. Hill, 254 S.C. 321, 327, 175
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On appeal to the South Carolina Supreme Court, Hall con-
tended that his convictions for assault and battery and for kid-
napping constituted double jeopardy, since these offenses were
circumstances proven in order to elevate the sexual battery to
criminal sexual conduct in the first degree. 10 Hall further con-
tended that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury
that in order to establish kidnapping, the state must prove that
the confining and carrying away of the victim was more than
merely incident to the commission of the sexual battery.211
A. Multiple Punishment and Double Jeopardy
The fifth amendment of the United States Constitution pro-
vides that no person shall "be subject for the same offence to be
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb. 21 2 This double jeopardy
clause has been held to provide three separate kinds of constitu-
tional protection: protection against a second prosecution for the
same offense after acquittal; protection against a second prose-
cution for the same offense after conviction; and protection
against multiple punishments for the same offense.213
The appellant in Hall contended that the consecutive
sentences imposed for each conviction amounted to multiple
S.E.2d 227, 230 (1970).
209. The offense of kidnapping is defined as follows:
Whoever shall unlawfully seize, confine, inveigle, decoy, kidnap, abduct or
carry away any other person by any means whatsoever without authority of
law, except when a minor is seized or taken by a parent thereof, shall be guilty
of a felony and, upon conviction, shall suffer the punishment of life imprison-
ment unless sentenced for murder as provided in § 16-3-20.
S.C. CoDE ANN. § 16-3-910 (Supp. 1983). In 1976, this statute was amended to eliminate
the requirement of proof that the victim was held "for ransom or reward."
210. Brief of Appellant at 6.
211. Id. at 12-13. The appellant also contended that the trial court erred in refusing
to allow appellant's counsel to review all notes which the state's witness possessed on
cross-examination. Brief of Appellant at 17-18. The court, however, held that since the
witness referred to his notes only because the appellant's counsel urged him to do so, the
trial judge's decision to allow appellant's counsel to inspect only those portions of the
notes actually referred to was proper. 280 S.C. at 78-79, 310 S.E.2d at 432.
212. U.S. CONsT. amend. V. Recognizing that the double jeopardy prohibition "rep-
resents a fundamental ideal in our constitutional heritage," the Supreme Court has ac-
cordingly held the double jeopardy clause applicable to the states through the fourteenth
amendment. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969). The South Carolina Consti-
tution provides essentially the same guarantee. S.C. CONsT. art. I, § 12.
213. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969). See also Brown v. Ohio, 432
U.S. 161, 165 (1977).
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punishments for the same offense in violation of the double
jeopardy clause.214 He argued that since assault and battery of a
high and aggravated nature and kidnapping were essentially
lesser included offenses of first degree criminal sexual conduct,
the crimes constituted the "same offense" for double jeopardy
purposes under the test defined in Blockburger v. United
States.15 As stated by the Supreme Court in Blockburger, "The
applicable rule is that where the same act or transaction consti-
tutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to
be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only
one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the
other does not."216
The appellant relied primarily upon Whalen v. United
States,1 7 in which the United States Supreme Court considered
the double jeopardy implications of the defendant's convictions
for felony murder and the underlying felony of rape. In Whalen,
the Court considered the prosecution's argument that the of-
fense of felony murder "does not in all cases require proof of [an
actual] rape."218 The Court rejected this contention, stating that
a case in which proof of rape is a necessary element of proof of
felony murder should be treated no differently than another case
requiring proof of each element of the offense.21 9
Thus, even though criminal sexual conduct may be elevated
to the first degree by proof of other enhancing factors, where the
state relies upon aggravated assault and battery or kidnapping
to prove such elevation, these lesser-included crimes necessarily
constitute the "same offense" as the greater offense since the
former do not require proof of a fact which the latter does not
require.22 o
214. Brief of Appellant at 6.
215. 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
216. Id. at 304. The Blockburger test has been adopted in South Carolina as the test
employed to determine whether particular crimes constitute the "same offense." See
State v. Lawrence, 266 S.C. 423, 223 S.E.2d 856 (1976).
217. 445 U.S. 684 (1980).
218. Id. at 694.
219. Id. The Court held that "where two statutory provisions proscribe the same
offense, they are construed not to authorize cumulative punishments in the absence of a
clear indication of contrary legislative intent." Id. at 692.
220. Presumably, there might have been two convictions under any test. If, for ex-
ample, the State relied solely upon aggravated assault and battery as the enhancing fac-
tor to elevate the sexual battery to first degree criminal sexual conduct, then proof of
[Vol. 36
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The court in Hall did not, however, consider whether the
crimes of aggravated assault and battery, kidnapping, and first
degree criminal sexual conduct constituted the same offense for
purposes of double jeopardy. Instead, the court relied upon the
recent decision in Missouri v. Hunter,2 1 in which the United
States Supreme Court stated that, "With respect to cumulative
sentences imposed in a single trial, the Double Jeopardy Clause
does no more than prevent the sentencing court from prescrib-
ing greater punishment than the legislature intended."' 2
In Missouri v. Hunter, the defendant was convicted of first
degree robbery and armed criminal action. The state's armed
criminal action statute expressly provided that punishment im-
posed thereunder "shall be in addition to any punishment pro-
vided by law for the crime committed by, with, or through the
use, assistance, or aid of a dangerous or deadly weapon. 223 The
Supreme Court upheld the two convictions, finding the intent of
the Missouri Legislature "crystal clear":
Where, as here, a legislature specifically authorizes cumulative
punishment under two statutes, regardless of whether those
two statutes proscribe the "same" conduct under Blockburger,
a court's task of statutory construction is at an end and the
prosecutor may seek and the trial court or jury may impose
cumulative punishment under such statutes in a single trial.22,
Relying upon this language, the South Carolina Supreme
Court in Hall similarly upheld the convictions, reasoning that
the state legislature in fact "has authorized cumulative punish-
ments for kidnapping, assault and battery of a high and aggra-
vated nature and first degree criminal sexual conduct. '22 5 Unlike
the Court in Missouri v. Hunter, however, the South Carolina
kidnapping would not be "necessary" to establish the sexual offense. Under the Block-
burger test, kidnapping and criminal sexual conduct therefore would not constitute the
"same offense." In Hall, however, the jury was instructed that it could consider both
aggravated assault and battery and kidnapping as enhancement factors. Record at 125.
Since the jury returned only a general verdict, it is not possible to determine which fac-
tor, if either, the jury considered in convicting the appellant.
221. 459 U.S. 359 (1983).
222. Id. at 366.
223. Id. at 362 (quoting Mo. ANN. STAT. § 559.225 (Vernon 1979))(current version of
statute at Mo. ANN. STAT. § 571.015 (Vernon 1979)).
224. 459 U.S. at 368-69.
225. 280 S.C. at 76, 310 S.E.2d at 431.
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Supreme Court failed to cite specific statutory language or legis-
lative history that authorizes cumulative punishment.
It is unclear how the court concluded that the South Caro-
lina legislature clearly intended to impose cumulative punish-
ments for first degree criminal sexual conduct, aggravated as-
sault and battery, and kidnapping. It appears that the court
relied solely upon the mere existence of more than one statute.
However, this seems to be an insufficient basis for inferring leg-
islative intent to impose cumulative punishment when offenses
are committed in a single course of conduct.226
In subsequent lower court cases, the holding of Missouri v.
Hunter has been limited to only those situations in which the
legislative intent to impose cumulative punishments is unmis-
takably clear.227 All federal courts, as well as a number of state
courts, follow the "rule of lenity"; that is, where the intention of
the legislature is unclear, the court will resolve doubt in favor of
the criminal defendant.228 The usual assumption regarding legis-
lative silence is that the legislature does not ordinarily intend to
impose multiple punishments. 29 By contriving to find the legis-
lative intent necessary to avoid application of traditional double
jeopardy principles, the decision in Hall abrogates the judicial
doctrine of lenity, and indicates the likelihood that multiple
punishments will be readily imposed in similar circumstances in
the future.230
226. See Bell v. State, 437 So.2d 1057 (Fla. 1983); Rodriguez v. State, 443 So.2d 286
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); State v. Evans, 660 S.W.2d 433 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983).
227. See, e.g., State v. Galaviz, 104 Idaho 328, 658 P.2d 999 (1983); Commonwealth
v. Bostic, 500 Pa. 345, 456 A.2d 1320 (1983); State v. Sweet, 36 Wash. App. 377, 675 P.2d
1236 (1984); State v. Gordon, 111 Wis. 2d 133, 330 N.W.2d 564 (1983). These cases deal
with the issue of enhanced punishment for use of a firearm.
228. Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 83-84 (1955); Davenport v. State, 543 P.2d
1204, 1209 (Alaska 1975); State v. Wilson, 25 Wash. App. 891, 894, 611 P.2d 1312, 1313
(1980).
229. See supra note 226 and accompanying text.
230. But see State v. Gordon, 111 Wis.2d 133, 137, 330 N.W.2d 564, 566
(1983)("[w]e look for legislative intent in the language of the statutes and, where the
statutes can reasonably be understood in more than one sense, in the legislative history
or in both the statutory language and the legislative history"). See also Albernax v.
United States, 450 U.S. 333, 340 (1981).
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B. Kidnapping as Merely Incidental to Commission of
Another Crime
In addition to rejecting the appellant's double jeopardy ar-
gument, the court in Hall also held that the trial judge did not
commit reversible error in refusing to instruct the jury that "in
order to establish kidnapping, the state must prove [that] the
confining and carrying away of the victim was more than
[merely] incident to the commission of" the sexual battery.2 31 In
so holding, the court has provided a substantial basis for the im-
position of disproportionately severe punishments for relatively
lesser crimes.
It is clear that in South Carolina, neither asportation nor
specific intent to kidnap is necessary to establish the crime of
kidnapping.2 82 The only requirement is that the victim be seized,
confined, or carried away "by any means whatsoever without au-
thority of law. '23 3 In the absence of some requirement that the
restraint of the victim be substantial or at least not merely inci-
dent to the commission of another crime, the consequences are
obviously and inescapably harsh. The penalty of life imprison-
ment is mandatory in cases of kidnapping. "[A] trial judge has
no discretion to impose a lesser sentence or suspend a portion of
the life sentence and impose probation.
'23 4
Nevertheless, the court in Hall failed to require that the re-
straint involved be substantial to constitute kidnapping, and in-
stead held that the restraint may be sufficient to constitute kid-
napping even though merely incidental to another crime.
Relying upon the North Carolina decision of State v. Fulcher,23 ,
the court stated that there is no constitutional prohibition
against convicting a defendant both for restraining his victim
and for the crime of which the restraint was in aid. As long as
that restraint is a separate, complete and independent act, it
need not be substantial in and of itself.236 In addition to re-
231. 280 S.C. at 77, 310 S.E.2d at 431-32.
232. See supra note 209.
233. Id.
234. State v. Hazel, 275 S.C. 392, 393, 271 S.E.2d 602, 603 (1980).
235. 294 N.C. 503, 243 S.E.2d 338 (1978).
236. 280 S.C. at 77, 310 S.E.2d at 431 (quoting State v. Fulcher, 294 N.C. at 524, 243
S.E.2d at 352)(emphasis added by the S.C. Supreme Court). The court, however, did
acknowledge the requirement that the restraint at least be a "separate, complete act,
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jecting any requirement of substantiality, the court further con-
cluded that "a defendant may not escape conviction for kidnap-
ping by asserting that the kidnapping was merely incidental to a
rape.1237 There are two opposing views with regard to whether
the crime of kidnapping encompasses restraints that are merely
incident to the commission of another crime. One view, adopted
by the court in Hall, maintains that seizure, detention or aspor-
tation of the victim which is otherwise sufficient to constitute
kidnapping will allow a conviction for kidnapping even if the act
is incidental to another crime. 238 The other view holds that a
restraint which is merely incidental to the commission of an-
other crime and which does not substantially increase the risk of
harm beyond that necessarily present in the other crime does
not constitute kidnapping.
239
There is no evidence that the South Carolina legislature in-
tended that the crime of kidnapping encompass all restraints in-
cidental to the commission of other crimes. If such were the
case, then definitions of second and third degree criminal sexual
conduct, in which there exists no aggravating circumstances,
would be rendered superfluous since every rape essentially in-
volves some detention "without authority of law"240 and would
therefore amount to first degree criminal sexual conduct.241
independent of and apart from the other felony." Id. at 77, 310 S.E.2d at 431 (quoting
State v. Fulcher, 294 N.C. at 524, 243 S.E.2d at 352).
237. 280 S.C. at 78, 310 S.E.2d at 432.
238. Case3 in which other courts adopt this view include: State v. Jacobs, 93 Ariz.
336, 380 P.2d 998 (1963)(convictions for rape and kidnapping from same incident up-
held); Samuels v. State, 253 A.2d 201 (Del. 1969)(defendant can be convicted of two
crimes in a rape/kidnap); State v. Morris, 281 Minn. 119, 160 N.W.2d 715 (1968) (convic-
tions for rape and kidnapping, crimes which overlapped, upheld). See generally Annot.,
43 A.L.R.3d 699 (1972).
239. The recent trend has been to adopt this aproach rather than the former. See
People v. Bridges, 199 Colo. 520, 612 P.2d 1110 (1980); Robinson v. United States, 388
A.2d 1210 (D.C. 1978); State v. Rich, 305 N.W.2d 739 (Iowa 1981) (dicta); People v.
Brown, 105 Mich. App. 58, 306 N.W.2d 392 (1981); Stalley v. State, 91 Nev. 671, 541
P.2d 658 (1975) (dicta); State v. Reiman, 284 N.W.2d 860 (S.D. 1979).
Although adopting a more restrictive view of this "incident" rule, both Kansas and
Florida require that the restraint "not be slight, inconsequential and merely incidental to
the other crime ... [or] of the kind inherent in the nature of the other crime." State v.
Buggs, 219 Kan. 203, 216, 547 P.2d 720, 731 (1976); see also Faison v. State, 426 So.2d
963, 965 (Fla. 1983).
240. See supra note 209.
241. Professor William S. McAninch reaches the same conclusion in McANINCH &
FAIREY, THE CRIbINAL LAW OF SOUTH CAROLINA 129-30 (1982).
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Although the full extent of the consequences of the decision
in Hall is as yet indeterminable, several undesirable results are
readily apparent. First, the mandatory punishment of life im-
prisonment for conviction of kidnapping may in many cases be
unduly severe and disproportionate to the crime, such as when
the victim is briefly detained during a simple robbery.242 Sec-
ondly, the risk of prosecutorial abuse is greatly increased since
the additional kidnapping charge may now be employed by the
state's attorneys as leverage to induce more guilty pleas.24 3
Finally, this decision constitutes a further emasculation of
the double jeopardy clause, which has already undergone in-
creasingly drastic changes in favor of the government it was
originally designed to restrain.
Robert C. Byrd
XI. A REAFFIRMATION OF A COURT'S SUMMARY CONTEMPT
POWER
In State v. Buchanan,244 the South Carolina Supreme Court
held that a motion to disqualify a judge for bias or prejudice
does not constitute contempt. Additionally, the court reaffirmed
the power of a court to summarily convict and punish for con-
tempt. Finally, the court held that a motions hearing attendant
to a habeas corpus petition is not a "critical stage" 245 invoking
defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel.
Appellant Buchanan appealed from two summary adjudica-
tions of contempt. The court appearance in which appellant was
held in contempt arose out of prior convictions of manslaughter
and armed robbery.2 46 Appellant's application for post-convic-
tion relief from these sentences was denied and he appealed to
242. See People v. Levy, 15 N.Y. 2d 159, 164, 204 N.E.2d 842, 844, 256 N.Y.S.2d
793, 796 (1963).
243. See State v. Dix, 282 N.C. 490, 501, 193 S.E.2d 897, 903-04 (1973).
244. 279 S.C. 194, 304 S.E.2d 819 (1983).
245. A critical stage occurs when "potential substantial prejudice to defendant's
rights inheres in the particular confrontation and the ability of counsel would help avoid
that prejudice." United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227 (1967).
246. Appellant was convicted of manslaughter and armed robbery on March 10,
1978. He received a sentence of thirty years for the manslaughter conviction and twenty-
five years for the armed robbery conviction. The sentences were to run consecutively.
The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed appellants conviction and sentence in Feb-
ruary 1980. State v. Buchanan, Op. No. 80-MO-43.
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the South Carolina Supreme Court.24 7 While the appeal was
pending, appellant filed a writ of habeas corpus with the Dar-
lington County Court of Common Pleas.248 He later filed several
motions concerning the habeas corpus petition,24 1 as well as a
motion concerning his appeal from the denial of post-conviction
relief.250 The motions, fied without the assistance of an attor-
ney, were "vague and confusing." 25 1
The Darlington County General Sessions Court called a
meeting to determine in which action the motions had been
filed. During the meeting between appellant, the trial court and
an attorney from the Attorney General's office, appellant repeat-
edly asked that his sentence be vacated. 252 The court explained
that appellant was not on trial and that the meeting was to clar-
ify the motions.
When the trial court was unable to determine appellant's
intentions in making the motions, it adjourned. The judge ad-
vised appellant that counsel would be appointed to clarify the
motions.253 Appellant then grabbed documents that the judge
had stated were records of the court.2" The court warned appel-
lant that he would be held in contempt, to which appellant re-
plied by moving that "he be moved out of here."2 55 The court
found appellant in contempt and sentenced him to six months
imprisonment to run consecutively with his current sentence.258
Seconds later, appellant asked that the judge recuse himself be-
247. Brief of Respondent at 2. The South Carolina Supreme Court upheld the de-
nial of post-conviction relief in November 1982. Buchanan v. State, Op. No. 82-MO-336.
248. The purpose of a habeas corpus petition is to test the legality of a prisoner's
current detention. See McCall v. State, 247 S.C. 15, 145 S.E.2d 419 (1965). A habeas
corpus petition is governed by S.C. Code Ann. §§ 17-17-10 to -200 (1976).
249. In December 1981, appellant filed an Affidavit of Poverty and a Petition to
Proceed In Forma Pauperis (without liability for court fees or costs). In January 1982,
appellant filed a motion for Appointment of Counsel, apparently in the habeas corpus
proceeding. He also filed an affidavit in support of that motion. All motions and affida-
vits were filed in the Darlington County Court of Common Pleas. Brief of Respondent at
3.
250. In April 1982, appellant filed a Motion to Waive Counsel and Proceed in Per-
son, or Right to the Attorney of his Choice in his appeal from the denial of post-convic-
tion relief. Brief of Respondent at 3.
251. 279 S.C. at 195, 304 S.E.2d at 820.
252. Record at 2, 3, 5, 6 & 8.
253. Id. at 6 & 7.
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cause he was prejudiced and would not give appellant a fair
trial. After being warned that the court would "give" him an-
other six month sentence, appellant retorted, "Give it to me! Be-
cause that'll be showing that you was prejudiced. '257 The court
then sentenced appellant to a second six month term of
imprisonment.
The South Carolina Supreme Court found that the trial
court properly convicted and sentenced appellant for the first
outburst.258 The court, however, held that appellant's request
that the judge recuse himself did not constitute contempt. The
court further held that appellant was not entitled to a jury trial
on the contempt charge, since the proper sentence was a single
six month term of imprisonment. 59
Courts have traditionally placed contempt in two catego-
ries. 2 0 The first distinguishes between civil and criminal con-
tempt. Criminal contempt is characterized by an unconditional
sentence imposed by a court to punish or deter.61 In contrast,
civil contempt is characterized by a conditional sentence
designed to coerce the recipient into a certain behavior. 262 The
second category distinguishes between direct or indirect con-
tempt.263 A direct contempt is any misbehavior in the presence
of the court, while an indirect contempt is committed out of the
view and hearing of the court.26 Based on these distinctions, ap-
pellant Buchanan committed a direct, criminal act of contempt
which the court, without a jury, punished in a summary
proceeding.
The distinction between indirect and direct contempt is
257. Id. at 9.
258. 279 S.C. at 196, 304 S.E.2d at 820.
259. Id.
260. See generally Dobbs, Contempt of Court: A Survey, 56 CoRNMr. L. REv. 183,
224-227, 235-239 (1971).
261. Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 428 (1911); Curlee v.
Howle, 277 S.C. 377, 384-85, 287 S.E.2d 915, 919 (1982).
262. 277 S.C. at 384-85, 287 S.E.2d at 919.
263. Several state statutes recognize a distinction between direct and indirect con-
tempt. See generally Note, Summary Proceedings in Direct Contempt Cases, 15 VAND.
L. REv. 241, 251 n. 60 (1961)(collection of state statutes regulating summary proceedings
in court cases). S.C. CoDE ANN. § 14-1-150 (1976) provides for summary punishment of
direct acts of contempt by fine or imprisonment. The court may also proceed under its
inherent contempt power, electing not to proceed under the statute. State v. Blanton,
278 S.C. 597, 599, 300 S.E.2d 286, 287 (1983).
264. Long v. McMilan, 226 S.C. 598, 608-09, 86 S.E.2d 477, 482 (1955).
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particularly important since a court may dispose of a direct con-
tempt in a summary proceeding26" without the procedural safe-
guards extended to those charged with indirect contempt.58
Courts and commentators have, however, criticized the summary
exercise of a court's contempt power.67
In South Carolina, the court's power to punish for contempt
is well settled.28 The supreme court has stated repeatedly that
the determination of contempt is within the trial court's discre-
tion and will not be disturbed in the absence of plain abuse of
that discretion.8 9 In Buchanan, then, the supreme court appar-
ently determined that the trial court abused its discretion when
it found contemptuous the defendant's request that the judge
recuse himself.
Several courts have held that a motion for disqualification
of a judge on the grounds of bias or prejudice does not consti-
tute contempt if presented in respectful language and manner. 70
Since appellant's request was arguably disrespectful, the court,
265. United States v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681, 694 n.12 (1964)(citing more than 50
cases supporting summary disposition of contempt). A summary proceeding is one which
"dispenses with the formality, delay and digression that would result from the issuance
of process, service of complaint and answer ... and all that goes with a conventional
court trial." Sacher v. U.S., 343 U.S. 1, 9 (1952). For a history and critical analysis of the
summary disposition of direct contempts, see Note, Summary Proceedings in Direct
Contempt Cases, 15 VAND. L. REV. 241 (1962).
266. A defendant who commits an indirect contempt is entitled to reasonable notice
and an opportunity to be heard, Cooke v. U.S., 267 U.S. 517, 537 (1925); to the right to
counsel, id.; to the presumption of innocence, United States v. Fleischman, 339 U.S. 349,
363 (1950); and to the right to a jury trial in proceedings involving serious criminal con-
tempts, Bloom v. IlM., 391 U.S. 194, 202 (1968).
267. See Green v. U.S., 356 U.S. 165, 193 (1958)(Black, J., dissenting) (calling sum-
mary punishment of criminal contempt an anomaly in the law). See also Comment,
Counsel and Contempt: A Suggestion that the Summary Power Be Eliminated, 18 DuQ.
L. Rsv. 289 (1980); Goldfarb, The Constitution and Contempt of Court, 61 MICH. L.
REv. 283 (1962).
268. Curlee v. Howle, 277 S.C. 377, 382, 287 S.E.2d 915, 917 (1982); State ex. rel
McLeod v. Hits, 272 S.C. 303, 305, 251 S.E.2d 746, 747 (1979); State v. Weinberg, 229
S.C. 286, 292, 92 S.E.2d 842, 845 (1956).
269. Means v. Means, 277 S.C. 428, 431, 288 S.E.2d 811, 812 (1982); Jackson v. Jack-
son, 241 S.C. 1, 15, 126 S.E.2d 855, 863 (1962); Fagan v. Timmons, 224 S.C. 286, 287, 78
S.E.2d 628, 628 (1953). For criticism of this standard of review, see Note, The Role of
Due Process in Summary Contempt Proceedings, 68 IowA L. Rav. 177, 192 (1982)(call-
ing for a more vigorous standard of appellate review in summary contempt cases). An-
other ground for reversal exists if the contempt holding is based on a finding that is
without evidentiary support. 277 S.C. at 431, 288 S.E.2d at 812-13; Brooks v. Brooks, 277
S.C. 322, 325, 286 S.E.2d 669, 671 (1982).
270. Holt v. Va., 381 U.S. 131, 136-37 (1965).
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utilizing its normal standard of review, could have upheld the
second determination of contempt. In the only South Carolina
decision addressing a similar charge, State v. Barnett,271 the
court upheld a finding of contempt against an attorney repre-
senting himself, who made an affidavit for a change of venue al-
leging the judge's prejudice. 27 2 The affidavit contained an unsup-
ported charge that the magistrate had, in a prior trial of the
same action, attempted to influence a juror against the attorney.
The court reasoned that maintenance of the integrity, authority
and dignity of all courts is of the utmost importance 78 and that
conduct offering "indignity or insult to a Judge" shall not be
tolerated.27 '
Case law from other jurisdictions supports a contempt find-
ing for appellant's second outburst. In Illinois v. Baxter,27 5 the
state supreme court upheld a defendant's conviction for direct
criminal contempt when his pro se petition for substitution of
the judge charged that the court was acting as a "Ku Klux Klan,
Gestapo Setup. 278 The court found that the defendant's charge
was intentionally disrespectful, abusive of the court and re-
flected upon the personal integrity of the judge. In a similar Cal-
ifornia case, Blodgett v. Superior Court of Santa Barbara
County,27 the court charged petitioner with contempt for his al-
legation that the judge had acted in the interests of petitioner's
adversary party. During the proceeding instituted to hear and
determine the contempt charge, petitioner claimed the judge
was disqualified from presiding over the proceeding. The court
found this claim constituted another and more flagrant
contempt.
278
Several grounds, however, support the inference that the
trial court in Buchanan abused its discretion in finding that ap-
pellant's request constituted criminal contempt. First, the su-
preme court has required, as an element of criminal contempt,
271. 98 S.C. 422, 82 S.E. 795 (1914).
272. Id. at 429, 82 S.E. at 798.
273. Id. at 428-29, 82 S.E. at 797-98.
274. Id. at 429, 82 S.E. at 798.
275. 50 Ill.2d 286, 278 N.E.2d 777 (1972).
276. Id. at 288, 278 N.E.2d at 778.
277. 210 Cal. 1, 290 P. 293 (1930).
278. Id. at 15-16, 290 P. at 299.
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the intent to obstruct the administration of justice.27  Arguably,
appellant lacked the requisite intent when he requested that the
judge recuse himself. Furthermore, a court traditionally imposes
the sanction of criminal contempt to vindicate its authority.2 °0
The court could reasonably have determined that appellant's re-
quest was less of an affront to its authority than his act of grab-
bing court records. Additionally, older decisions from other ju-
risdictions hold that a motion to disqualify a judge on account of
alleged bias and prejudice does not constitute contempt.281
The supreme court, however, may have been influenced by
appellant's argument that he was entitled to a jury trial of the
contempt charges because the sentence imposed exceeded six
months.282 The court suggests that appellant would have been
entitled to a jury trial if it had affirmed the twelve month sen-
tence.288 The authority cited by the court, however, dictates a
different conclusion. In Codispoti v. Pennsylvania,2 " the United
States Supreme Court held, in a post-verdict adjudication of
contempt, that the sixth amendment requires a jury trial if the
sentences, when aggregated, exceed six months.8 5 The Court
stated, however, that the judge does not exhaust his power to
convict and punish summarily whenever the punishment im-
posed for separate contemptuous acts during trial exceeds six
months.2 6 Therefore, the Codispoti decision did not affect a
279. State v. Scott, 269 S.C. 542, 545, 238 S.E.2d 217, 218 (1977); State v. Weinberg,
229 S.C. 286, 292-93, 92 S.E.2d 842, 845 (1956).
280. 221 U.S. at 428; Dobbs, supra note 260, at 235.
281. See Annot., 70 A.L.R.3d 797 (1976).
282. For a historical analysis of a contemnor's right to jury trial, see Comment,
Right to Jury Trial in Contempt Cases: A Critical View of the Sentence Aggregation
Rules in Codispoti v. Pennsylvania and Taylor v. Hayes, 70 Nw. U.L. Rv. 533, 534-45
(1975).
283. The court's statement, "[blecause appellants sentence for criminal contempt
consists of one six-months term of imprisonment, he is not entitled to a jury trial," sup-
ports such an inference. 279 S.C. at 196, 304 S.E.2d at 820.
284. 418 U.S. 506 (1974). In Codispoti, the trial judge imposed lengthy sentences for
contempt at the end of the trial. Petitioners appealed and the Supreme Court remanded
for the contempt charges to be heard by another judge. Mayberry v. Pa., 400 U.S. 455
(1971). On remand, the judge without a jury found petitioners guilty of criminal con-
tempt and imposed multiple six month sentences. Petitioners again appealed. The court
granted certiorari, limited to the issue of petitioners' right to a jury trial of the contempt
charges. 418 U.S. at 507.
285. 418 U.S. at 514-17.
286. 418 U.S. at 514. Justice Marshall did not concur in the part of the opinion that
would allow unlimited consecutive summary punishments. Id. at 518. See Comment,
[Vol. 36124
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trial court's power to summarily convict and punish direct con-
tempt. Thus, under Codispoti, appellant would not have been
entitled to a jury trial even if the court had affirmed the twelve
month sentence.
Certainly, after Codispoti, a court must distinguish between
summary and post-verdict dispositions of contempt when ad-
dressing a contemnor's right to a jury trial. The South Carolina
Supreme Court failed to make this critical distinction in
Buchanan and in another recent case, Curlee v. Howle.2s7 The
court in Curlee stated the Codispoti rule as follows:
"[D]efendants in state criminal trials who are committed to im-
prisonment of more than 6 months are entitled to a jury
trial."188 This statement of the rule misleads the reader unless
qualified as applicable only to post-verdict adjudications of con-
tempt. Furthermore, in State v. Blanton,2 9 the court denied ap-
pellant's request for a jury trial in a post-verdict adjudication of
an indirect criminal contempt. The court made no reference to
Codispoti2 0 and stated that in South Carolina, "It has long been
established that there is no right to a jury trial, when the circuit
courts of this state proceed under its [sic] common law contempt
power." 1 Again, this statement is misleading unless qualified as
applicable only to charges of indirect contempt.
The court's misapplication of the Codispoti rule may signal
its distaste for jury trials of contempt charges. Objections to the
right of jury trial for a direct contempt include: (1) the jury has
no question of fact to resolve when the contemptuous conduct
supra note 282, at 545 n.65 for conclusion that eight Justices would not permit aggrega-
tion of sentences imposed during trial to determine if a jury trial is required.
287. 277 S.C. 377, 287 S.E.2d 915 (1982). For an analysis of the Curlee decision, see
35 S.C.L. Rev. 118 (1983).
288. 277 S.C. at 383, 287 S.E.2d at 918 (emphasis in original). The court correctly
determined that the Codispoti rule was inapplicable since Curlee involved a civil con-
tempt proceeding. Id. at 384, 287 S.E.2d at 918.
289. 278 S.C. 597, 300 S.E.2d 286 (1983).
290. Codispoti involved contempts committed during trial, not an indirect contempt
as in Blanton. The court in Codispoti did not distinguish between a court's common law
and statutory power to punish for contempt. It appears that petitioners in Codispoti
were punished by a Pennsylvania court proceeding under its common law power. See
Mayberry v. Pa., 400 U.S. at 462-66 (1971).
291. 278 S.C. at 599, 300 S.E.2d at 287. Since appellant received only a four month
sentence for his criminal contempt, and the conduct was not committed during trial, the
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occurs in the presence of the court; (2) the judge still imposes
the sentence for the contemptuous conduct; and (3) a jury trial
is cumbersome if either side desires to call a large number of
witnesses.9 2 Even though the court in Buchanan, Curlee and
Blanton correctly decided that appellants in each case were not
entitled to jury trials,293 a clarification by the court of the jury
trial requirement in a contempt case would be welcome.
Additionally, appellant contended that his sixth amendment
right to counsel was violated when he appeared without benefit
of counsel at the motions hearing and was summarily convicted
of criminal contempt. The Supreme Court has held that the
right to counsel attaches after adversary judicial proceedings
have been initiated against a person,294 and the right applies to
any "critical stage" of the prosecution.95 Traditionally, the
Court has recognized the criminal defendant's right to counsel as
more fundamental than his right to a jury trial.29 8
In South Carolina, the test for determining a critical stage,
set forth in State v. Williams, is "whether the particular stage
[of the proceedings] either requires or offers opportunity to take
a procedural step which will have prejudicial effects in later pro-
ceedings, or whether events transpire that are likely to prejudice
the ensuing trial.129 7 When the motions hearing was called, ap-
pellant was not charged with a crime, so there was no possibility
that the defense of his case would be prejudiced. The more diffi-
cult issue is whether the motions hearing constituted a proce-
dural step the result of which might be prejudicial in a later
hearing on his habeas corpus petition. 98 Since this was a novel
292. For a discussion and rebuttal of the objections to the right of jury trial for
direct contempts, see Note, Criminal Contempt-Right to Jury Trial for Direct Con-
tempt and Aggregated Sentences, 40 Mo. L. REv. 354, 356-57 (1975).
293. See infra notes 288 and 291.
294. Kirby v. Ill., 406 U.S. 682, 688 (1972)(citing a line of constitutional cases dating
back to Powell v. Ala., 287 U.S. 45 (1932)). For an analysis of the Argersinger and Kirby
decisions, see Note, The Right to Counsel: The Argersinger-Kirby Dichotomy, 25 S.C.L.
REv. 292 (1973).
295. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 236-37 (1967).
296. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 30-37 (1972) (recognizing historical
support for limiting a trial by jury to serious criminal cases but stating "there is no such
support for a similar limitation on the right to assistance of counsel," id. at 30). See also
12 DuQ. L. REv. 115, 120-21 (1973).
297. State v. Williams, 263 S.C. 290, 294-95, 210 S.E.2d 298, 300 (1974).
298. If the application for post conviction relief presents questions of law or issues
of fact requiring a hearing, Rule 5 of the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act re-
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issue, a more clearly articulated basis for the court's decision
that the motions hearing was not a critical stage would have
been helpful. The facts of Buchanan, however, indicate that the
hearing judge was "just trying to find out" what appellant was
trying to do in order that it might be done properly. 9 There-
fore, the test set out in Williams does not warrant a finding that
the motions hearing in Buchanan was a critical stage.
Appellant further objected to being convicted of contempt
without benefit of counsel. The Supreme Court has held that
due process and the sixth amendment require that one charged
with contempt of court have a reasonable opportunity to obtain
counsel to represent him in the contempt proceeding.300 The
Court, however, has recognized an exception to this right for
charges of misconduct committed in open court in the presence
of the judge.301 Thus, the court in Buchanan correctly decided
that appellant was not entitled to benefit of counsel before being
summarily punished for his outbursts.
Appellant contended, however, that Argersinger v. Ham-
lino2 requires representation by counsel before any imprison-
ment can occur.303 Appellant based his assertion on the broad
language in Argersinger that, "[A]bsent a knowing and intelli-
gent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any offense,
whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony unless he
was represented by counsel at his trial. 30 4 The court deemed
appellant's reliance on Argersinger "misplaced. '3
05
Initially, the impact of the broad holding in Argersinger on
the summary contempt power was unclear.306 One authority con-
cluded that the summary contempt power fell within the
quires appointment of counsel for an indigent person. S.C. CODE ANN. Sup. CT. R. 50(5)
(Supp. 1983).
299. Record at 3.
300. Holt v. Va., 381 U.S. 131 (1965); Cooke v. U.S., 267 U.S. 517 (1925).
301. In re Green, 369 U.S. 689, 692 (1962); Cooke v. U.S., 267 U.S. 517, 534-37
(1925).
302. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
303. 279 S.C. at 196-97, 304 S.E.2d at 820-21. In Argersinger, the Supreme Court
reversed an indigent's 90 day sentence for conviction of carrying a concealed weapon.
The ground for reversal was that petitioner had not been represented by counsel in his
criminal prosecution. Id. at 40.
304. 407 U.S. at 37.
305. 279 S.C. at 197, 304 S.E.2d at 821.
306. See Annot., 52 A.L.R.3d 1002, 1007-09 (1973).
1984]
57
Tate et al.: Criminal Law
Published by Scholar Commons,
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REvEw
Argersinger holding.s0 7 Such an application of Argersinger
would seriously hamper a court's ability to deal summarily with
direct contempts since many exercises of the power involve wit-
nesses who are not represented in court or of attorneys in their
representation of clients. Recognizing the possibility of serious
interference with the contempt power, courts have not applied
Argersinger to summary contempt proceedings. Thus, appel-
lant's reliance on it in an appeal from a summary adjudication
on contempt was misplaced.
Several recent cases demonstrate that a court's power to
proceed summarily in direct contempt cases is intact. In United
States v. Wilson,303 the Supreme Court addressed a court's ca-
pacity to deal summarily with contempt. Petitioners in that case
had pleaded guilty to separate bank robberies.30 9 The district
court granted them immunity to testify in the trial of another
charged with bank robbery. When each refused on grounds of
self-incrimination, he was sentenced to six months imprison-
ment for contempt of court.3 10 The appellate court reversed the
summary convictions and remanded for a hearing on the con-
tempt charges. 31  The Supreme Court upheld the summary adju-
dications of contempt. The Court stated that the conduct consti-
tuted "an affront to the court, and ... summary contempt must
be available to vindicate the authority of the court as well as
provide the recalcitrant witness with some incentive to
testify. '3
12
In Bell v. Wolfish, 3 ' the Supreme Court again reaffirmed its
position on a court's summary contempt power. In addressing
the rights of pre-trial detainees, 1 4 the Court recognized that,
307. Roasman, The Scope of the Sixth Amendment: Who is a Criminal Defendant?
12 Au. CRibi. L. REv. 633, 638-639 (1975).
308. 421 U.S. 309 (1975).
309. Id. at 311.
310. Id. at 311-12. The district court was acting under Fed. R. Crim. P. 42(a), which
permits summary criminal contempt punishment for direct contempts. Id. at 313. For
text of the statute, see note 317. Petitioner Wilson was represented by counsel but Bryan
was not. Wilson's counsel attempted to represent both parties. Id. at 312.
311. 488 F.2d 1231 (2d Cir. 1973).
312. 421 U.S. at 316.
313. 441 U.S. 520 (1979). In Bell, the Court considered challenges made by pre-trial
detainees to numerous conditions of confinement.
314. Pre-trial detainees are "those persons who have been charged with a crime but
who have not yet been tried on the charge." Id. at 523.
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"[A] detainee may not be punished prior to an adjudication of
guilt in accordance with due process of law."315 The Court ex-
plicitly stated, however, that it did not intend to cast doubt on
the historical exceptions to this general principle, "exceptions
such as the power summarily to punish for contempt of
court."3 16
Furthermore, Rule 42(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure still authorizes summary disposition of instances of
criminal contempt committed in the presence of the court.1
Clearly, a court's power to deal summarily with contempt was
not affected by the court's broad language in Argersinger. Thus,
the South Carolina Supreme Court correctly determined that
Argersinger did not bar the imposition of the contempt sentence
upon appellant.
In the context of a summary contempt proceeding, the court
in Buchanan addressed issues of some constitutional signifi-
cance. The decision may not aid one in predicting what conduct
will be considered contemptuous since that determination de-
pends largely upon the facts of the case. One can be certain after
this decision, however, that in South Carolina a court has the
power to adjudge conduct contemptuous and to deal summarily
with instances of direct contempt over the contemnor's due pro-
cess objections.
Jan Schaffer Simmons
315. Id. at 535.
316. Id. at 536 n.17.
317. FED. R. CRm. P. 42(a) provides in relevant part- (a) Summary Dispostion. A
criminal contempt may be punished summarily if the judge certifies that he saw or heard
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